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1. Introduction
The most profound demographic trend shaping our budgetary and economic future is that older Americans are living much longer. Although
the maturing of the baby-boom generation will soon accelerate the aging
of the population, the shift to an older age structure is a permanent
change that reflects better medical care and improved lifestyles.
The percentage of the population 65 years old or older is projected to
rise from 12% now to 20% in 2030, a 65% increase in the relative number
of individuals eligible for social security retirement benefits and federally
financed health care. Even more startling is the projected increase in the
very old, who are the most intensive consumers of medical care. The
Census Bureau anticipates1 that the group over 75 will rise from 6.1% of
the population in 2000 to 11.2% by 2050. And the group over 85 is
expected to rise from 1.6% of the population to 4.6%.
Under current law, the aging of the American population during the
next four decades will require doubling the share of national income that
the government spends on retirement income and healthcare for those
Martin Feldstein is professor of economics at HarvardUniversityand president of the
NationalBureauof EconomicResearch.AndrewSamwickis assistantprofessorof economics at DartmouthCollege and a facultyresearchfellow of the NationalBureauof Economic
Research.The currentpaper, which was presented on April 4 at the NBER's1997Macro
Annual conference, extends and supersedes the results presented in Feldstein and
Samwick(1996).Weare gratefulforcommentsfromparticipantsin the Harvard-MIT
Public
Economics Seminar, the 1996 NBERconference on PrivatizingSocial Security,and the
participantsin the NBERMacroAnnual conference,particularlyour discussants.
1. These are the Census Bureau'sintermediateprojections.More rapid medicalprogress
and greater changes in lifestyles could significantlyacceleratethe proportionof older
persons in the population.
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who are no longer employed. Since medical costs rise sharply with age,
the demographic trends will cause the costs of Medicare and Medicaid to
rise even more rapidly than the retirement costs.
The social security and Medicare programs now cost 8% of GDP. The
federal government also spends an additional 0.4% of GDP on meanstested Medicaid benefits for the aged. The Congressional Budget Office
projects that the total cost of these programs will rise to 16% of GDP in
2030 and to about 18% of GDP in 2050.2
Financing such an increase in government spending on a pay-as-yougo basis would require a tax increase equal to doubling the personal
income tax or to raising the payroll tax from the current 15.3% of covered
wages3 to more than 35% even if the higher tax rates did not shrink the
tax base. While reductions in retirement pensions and improvements in
the efficiency of the healthcare system could modulate this increase, any
plausible level of health and retirement benefits would still require very
burdensome tax rates that would greatly increase the distortions and
deadweight loss of the overall tax system.4
The obvious solution to this problem is for individuals to prefund
these expenditures of old age with a system of mandatory saving accounts.5 Although the life-cycle model of rational individual behavior
implies that individuals would do such saving for themselves on a voluntary basis if the government did not provide the current universal benefits for old age, in reality some individuals would not save adequately for
their old age, either because of simple shortsightedness or because they
explicitly decide to consume all of their earnings during their working
years and then to rely on whatever means-tested public and private
2. See Congressional Budget Office (1996, p. 78). The projected social security costs are
based on the "intermediate" assumption of the social security actuaries, which many
experts believe understate future program costs. The projected healthcare costs are also
based on optimistic assumptions, particularly the assumption that the healthcare costs
per Medicare enrollee will decline to the rate of increase of private-sector wages after
2007.
3. Covered wages are currently wage and salary income up to $65,400 (in 1997), an amount
that is indexed with a lag to changes in the average level of covered wages.
4. The deadweight loss of the payroll tax is the result of changes in labor supply broadly
defined (including not only labor-force participation and hours but also such things as
individual effort and risktaking, education, choice of occupation, and choice of location)
and changes in the form of compensation (substituting fringe benefits and enhanced
working conditions for taxable cash). The deadweight loss of the personal income tax
also reflects tax-induced changes in the timing of consumption. The increased deadweight loss due to higher tax rates can therefore be large even if there is no change in
working hours or in the rate of saving. See Feldstein (1978, 1995b, 1997).
5. Many countries have shifted to such a system or are considering doing so. These include
Argentina, Australia, Chile, Japan, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. Sweden has recently made a step in that direction. For further information on the systems in several of
these countries, see Feldstein (1996b).
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assistance will be available after retirement.6 Mandatory individual accounts would in effect approximate what individuals would rationally
choose to do if they had adequate foresight and were not diverted by the
possibility of a means-tested transfer.7
The present paper examines the basic economics of replacing the existing pay-as-you-go system with such mandatory individual funded accounts. The primary focus is on social security pensions, but Section 9
extends this to health benefits for the aged.
Although we have emphasized the term "prefunding" and avoided
the term "privatize" in this introduction, the system of individual accounts that we discuss in this paper can be described as "privatizing"
social security. We regard a system as effectively privatized if benefits are
based on defined contribution accounts invested in private securities
with the investments controlled by the individuals themselves.8 The
current paper emphasizes the advantage of prefunding and does not
deal with other aspects of privatization such as the matching of investments to individual preferences and avoiding the problems of politicization that could come with greater government control.

2. TheLong-Term
Outlookfor SocialSecurityandMedicare
Much of the popular discussion and political concern about the outlook
for social security and Medicare focuses on the projected "insolvency" or
"bankruptcy" of the system. These programs are now in surplus, taking
in more in earmarked payroll taxes than they spend on benefits, thus
reducing the overall federal budget deficit. But by the year 2010, according to the government actuaries, social security benefits will exceed the
payroll tax receipts. The program will be in deficit and that deficit will
exacerbate the overall deficit of the federal government. At that time, the
social security program will begin to draw down the trust fund that it
has been accumulating since the early 1980s, selling the bonds in the
trust fund to the public. By the year 2030, the social security trust fund is
projected to be exhausted.
6. There is of course an enormous literature on the effect of social security on saving for
retirement. For a recent comment on this work, see Feldstein (1996a).
7. Because individuals differ in their tastes, circumstances, and life expectancy, a system of
mandatory individual accounts can at best be right "on average" and not for each
individual. Mandatory saving accounts therefore involve some inefficiency even if the
average level is set correctly. The theoretical alternative of means-tested benefits would
however also involve distortions to saving and labor-market behavior. An examination
of these options lies beyond the scope of the current paper.
8. We recognize that some would reject the "privatize" label in this case because the
government specifies the amount of the annual contributions and restricts the postretirement payouts.
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Although the talk of looming social securitybankruptcyhas increased
interest in fundamentalreform,these notions have little economicmeaning. The social security and Medicareprogramsare said to be insolvent
and potentially bankruptbecause they use earmarkedtaxes and a trust
fund. Other federal programs such as education and defense have no
earmarked taxes and no trust fund and therefore cannot be seen as
insolvent or bankrupt.Moreover,the trust fund is simply an accounting
convention. Once benefits begin to exceed receipts, the social security
program must borrow from the general public. The trust fund permits
selling bonds that have in principle been previously set aside for this
purpose. But the economic impactof the social securitydeficitwill be the
same after 2010 whether or not such a fund exists.
Because of the large size of the projecteddeficits in social securityand
Medicare, the accumulatingdebt and resulting debt service under current law would grow rapidly, placing an impossible burden on future
generations. The implicationof these deficitshas been highlightedby the
generational account calculations of Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff
(1991).They show that, with no change in existing programsand taxes,
the generations born after the currentyear would in the aggregatebear
net tax burdens of more than 80%of their personal incomes. Since this
net tax burden is calculatedas the differencebetween the taxes paid and
the transferpayments received by those individuals, the actual tax rates
they would face would be even higher. This way of describingthe implications of the currentsystem makes it very clearthat the currentarrangements are simply not viable.
The calculations of the Congressional Budget Office (1996)show the
same thing in a more familiarand therefore perhaps more transparent
way by contrastingthe projectedprimarydeficits(i.e., the deficitsexcluding interest on the nationaldebt) and the projectedtotaldeficitsincluding
the interest on the national debt. The basic CBO forecasts are summarized in Table1.
The primarydeficit rises in parallelwith the growth of the social security and health benefits for the aged, although at a somewhat slower
rate. The primarydeficits in turn cause the nationaldebt to rise, and the
interest on that higher debt leads to even faster growth of the national
debt. It is this explosive growth of the national debt and the resulting
interest cost that explains why the burden on future generations of taxpayers rises to such high levels in the generationalaccountinganalysis.
Table 1 shows clearly that, without the increased budget cost of the
entitlement programsfor the aged (or with an increaseof taxes sufficient
to fund their growth), the primarydeficit would not increaseand therefore the total deficit would not be on its explosive path.
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Table1 SOCIALSECURITY,HEALTHBENEFITS,AND PROJECTED
BUDGETDEFICITS
of GDP
Percentage
Year

2000

2010

2030

2050

5

5

7

7

Medicareand Medicaid
Total

5
10

6
11

10
18

12
19

Primarydeficit
National debt
Totaldeficit

-1
51
2

0
64
4

4
157
12

5
311
19

Social security

The true financial problem of the social security and Medicare programs is not the potential for insolvency under the existing system of
earmarked taxes but the fact that, without fundamental reform, a major
tax increase would be required to finance these programs as the population ages. The shift to a system of funded benefits based on individual
accounts would avoid such a tax increase. As the analysis in the next
section shows, the contributions to such accounts would be very much
smaller than the taxes needed in a pay-as-you-go system. Moreover,
because those contributions would be directly linked to the benefits that
individuals would later receive, the distortionary effects and resulting
deadweight losses would be further reduced.

3. A RealisticTransitionPathto PrefundedSocialSecurity
This section describes a method of shifting from the existing pay-as-yougo financing of social security retirement benefits to a fully prefunded
system. The analysis is based on the demographic and economic predictions of the Bureau of the Census and the Social Security Administration, which are described in more detail in Feldstein and Samwick (1996,
Section 4). We begin by describing how the funded system and the
transition would look to a typical employee and then present the aggregate implications for tax rates, fund contributions, and the accumulation
of the capital stock.
3.1 THEFULLYFUNDEDSYSTEMIN THELONGRUN
In the long run, the current pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system would be
replaced by a fully funded system in which employees over the age of 30
(and their employers) make annual contributions to IRA-type accounts
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that we shall refer to as personalretirementaccounts(PRAs).9 The funds in
these accounts would be invested in the individual's choice of stocks and
bonds. The income and capital gains on these accounts would not be
taxed at any time. In addition, the government would contribute to each
account the extra corporate income tax that would be collected as a result
of the increased saving. With this rebate of the corporate tax, the accounts would earn the full pretax real rate of return of 9%.10When the
individual reached retirement age, the accumulated fund would be used
to buy an annuity that earns the same rate of return.
The level of the annual PRA saving in our calculations is set so that the
resulting annuity equals the benefits that would be paid under the current PAYGO system. This makes it easy to evaluate the gain from
prefunding by focusing just on the amounts that employees (and their
employers) would pay during their working years. In an actual program,
contributions would probably be set at a higher level so that some of the
gain from prefunding could be enjoyed during the retirement years.
The use of a 9% real rate of return in these calculations deserves
further comment. The real pretax return on capital in the nonfinancial
corporate sector can be estimated by comparing the sum of interest,
dividends, retained earnings and all corporate taxes with the replacement value of the capital stock. For the years 1960 through 1994, this
averaged 9.3%.11A 9% real pretax return is also consistent with the longterm portfolio returns with which most of us are more familiar. A portfolio of 60% equity and 40% debt (essentially the financing ratio of nonfinancial corporations) had a yield of about 5.5% over both the postwar
period and the period since 1926. Since corporate taxes at the federal,
state, and local level take approximately 40% of pretax debt and equity
income (Rippe, 1995), a portfolio return of 5.5% of income corresponds
to a pretax real return of about 9%. We return in Section 7 to discuss the
implications of the riskiness of this rate of return.
With a 9% rate of return, the employer-employee contribution to the
personal retirement account in the fully funded system that would be
required over the long term to fund the benefits implied by current law
9. In our earlier paper (Feldstein and Samwick, 1996) we referred to these accounts as
Mandatory Individual Retirement Accounts (MIRAs). We have renamed them here to
avoid the mandatory label because, in principle, individuals would be able to decide
whether or not they wanted to save in this way or to continue with the existing PAYGO
system.
10. An alternative analysis in which the government does not rebate the extra corporate
revenue is discussed later in this section.
11. See Rippe (1995). Poterba and Samwick (1995) found a value of 9.2% for the years 1947
through 1995 and of 8.5% for the more recent period when they ignored property taxes
paid by corporations.
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would be just 2.02% of covered wages (instead of the 18.75% required in
a PAYGO system.12 Since this figure is the result of a complex simulation
embodying many economic and demographic assumptions, it is useful
to consider a simple "back of the envelope" calculation that shows the
plausibility of this remarkable difference. Consider therefore an individual who saves at age 45 (representing the midpoint of the years when the
individual is working and contributing) and subsequently dissaves at
age 75 (representing the midpoint of the retirement years). Over this 30year interval, one dollar grows at 9% to $13.27. In contrast, as Paul
Samuelson (1958) taught the economics profession many years ago, the
PAYGO system provides a return equal to the rate of growth of the tax
base, i.e., to the rate of growth of average wages plus the rate of growth
of the number of labor-force participants. Using the 1.1% growth rate of
GDP assumed for the long run by the social security actuaries13implies
that one dollar of PAYGO contributions at age 45 produces benefits of
$1.35 at age 75. For every dollar of tax that must be paid in a PAYGO
system, a fully funded system requires only 1.39/13.27 = 0.105 dollars.
Thus an 18.75% payroll tax could be replaced by a 1.97%-of-payroll
contribution to a PRA. This calculation produces a result that is remarkably close to the 2.02% PRA contribution calculated with our much more
elaborate model.
If the government does not rebate the incremental corporate tax revenue that results from the additional PRA saving, the rate of return on the
PRA accounts will be 5.4%. In the long run this would require PRA contributions of 5.67% of payroll, significantly higher than the 2.02% of payroll
with the full 9% rate of return, but still very much lower than the 18.75%
tax with the PAYGO system. Of course, the government would have the
extra 3.6% of the accumulated PRA balances in new tax receipts with
which to reduce other taxes or to increase other government spending.14
In Section 8 we discuss the uncertainty of the portfolio return on the
12. The 18.75% is our estimate (see Table 2), but replicates the calculations of the Social
Security Administration.
13. See Committee on Ways and Means (1996, p. 69). Such a long-term rate of GDP growth
may seem surprisingly low relative to the 3.1% growth over the past four decades. But
the recent decades have been characterized by several trends (a rapid growth of
working-age population, increases in female labor-force participation, and the rise in
educational attainment) that cannot continue indefinitely. Although we know of no
other careful forecasts stretching 75 years into the future, it is interesting that the 25year forecast by Data Resources shows GDP growth declining gradually to 1.4 percent
in 2020.
14. The 5.4% rate of return would be the full national rate of return on the PRA saving if
that saving replaced foreign capital in the United States or were itself invested abroad.
The well-known Feldstein-Horioka (1980) evidence implies that this is not the relevant
case.
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assets in the PRAs and show that individuals can be virtually certain
(i.e., a probability greater than 0.99) to receive at least as much from a
funded annuity as they would have in social security benefits if they
contribute less than 3% of covered earnings instead of the 18.75% payroll tax that would be required in the PAYGO system. Until Section 8 we
ignore risk in our calculations.
3.2 THEBASICTRANSITIONPROCESS
The prospect of making a very low contribution to a PRA instead of
paying a much higher payroll tax in a PAYGO system is obviously very
appealing. An important practical consideration, however, is the nature
of the transition from the existing system to this long-run steady state. A
common concern is that the transition generation must "pay twice," i.e.,
must continue to pay for the existing retirees while also saving for their
own retirement. Since the social security payroll tax (excluding the Medicare portion) is now 12.4% of covered wages, this appears to imply that
the current generation would be required to pay more than 24%. Fortunately, that perception is false.
Consider for example the following simple method of phasing in a
prefunded system by extending it to one annual birth cohort each year:
the current 30-year-olds begin prefunding their retirement in year 1 of
the transition, they are joined in year 2 by those who then are 30 years
old, etc. It is clear that the extra tax that this transition generation would
have to pay (in addition to the regular PAYGO tax) would be the 2% of
payroll required to fund their own retirement on the assumption that
they would receive no PAYGO benefits.
Such a transition is of course very slow and denies the benefits of
prefunding to everyone who is over the age of 30 at the time that the
transition begins. Because prefunding is introduced so slowly, the present value of the benefit of the transition is less than it could be with a
more rapid phase-in. A variety of alternative transition paths are possible. We have selected one to explore what we think combines a moderate pace of phasing in with a relatively low maximum extra contribution
rate that starts at only 2.0% of payroll and then declines.
Before we analyze this particular transition path to a prefunded system, it is helpful to consider a simpler and more rapid transition in
which there is no phase-in but instead an immediate and complete shift
to the funded system for all employees. Retirees continue to receive their
PAYGO benefits, and those employees who have contributed PAYGO
taxes in the past continue to receive corresponding PAYGO benefits
when they retire. For those who are over age 30 when the transition
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begins,15 the funding contributions are set so that the combination of
their prefunded annuity and the PAYGO benefits will equal the social
security benefits provided in current law.
During the transition to a fully funded system, each employee (and
his/her employer) would continue to make payroll tax payments. The
amount of the PRA contribution would be taken as a credit against a total
payroll tax obligation, thereby making it costless to the individual to
contribute the necessary amount to the PRA. The total payroll tax rate
would be set in each year so that the net payroll tax available after
subtracting the PRA contributions would fund the existing social security obligations.16
Consider first those individuals who are less than 30 years old when
the transition begins. Since an employee at age 30 is deemed to have
accrued no rights to future PAYGO benefits,l7 as each birth cohort
reaches age 30, each individual in that age group would contribute to his
or her PRA an amount that, accumulating at 9%, would finance an
annuity at age 65 (also with a yield of 9%) that produces the same
benefits as would have been provided by the social security system
under existing law. The annual contribution rate of this group would
remain constant as they age; i.e., they would buy their retirement annuities with a level premium as a percentage of wage. This group would
receive no PAYGO benefits when they retired.
Those employees who are older than 30 when the transition begins
would also contribute to PRAs, but at retirement would receive a mixture of PAYGObenefits and PRA annuity payments. Their PAYGObenefits would be based on the payroll taxes that they had paid during the
years before the transition to the funded system began.18 The gap be15. We focus on age 30 because current social security rules base benefits on the taxes paid
during the 35 years of highest earnings, typically between 30 and 64. We therefore
assume that individuals do not contribute to the prefunded accounts until they reach
age 30.
16. Initially the payroll tax rate would be the sum of 12.4% and the required aggregate PRA
contributions. When the trust fund is exhausted, the total payroll tax rate would be set
as the sum of the tax required to meet the remaining PAYGO obligations and the
required aggregate PRA contributions.
17. See footnote 15.
18. The rate of return imputed to these payroll tax payments would be the rate of return
that individuals in their birth cohort would expect to receive on their lifetime tax
payments in the existing unfunded system. Although the long-term implicit rate of
return is the Samuelsonian growth of the tax base, the actual rate of return varies by
birth cohort. We use an updated version of the estimated rates of return derived by
Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert, and Shoven (1987) that we have described in Feldstein and
Samwick (1996, Section 4.3). This implicit return declined from 7.0% among individuals born before 1915 to less than 1.5% among individuals born after 1960.
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tween these PAYGO benefits and the benefits that they would receive in
the existing unfunded system would be filled by the PRA annuity. There
would be no change in their combined PAYGO plus PRA benefits. The
only thing that would change is the source of the benefits. The PRA
contributions would be set so that, with a 9% real return, they would
provide the required level of annuity payments.
This method of calculating each individual's PRA contribution means
that during the transition the PRA contribution rate depends on the
individual's birth cohort. A 55-year-old, for example, would contribute
3.52% of his covered earnings, while a 40-year-old could contribute
2.05%. Since these PRA contributions would be credited against the
individual's total payroll tax liability, these differences in PRA contributions would not translate into differences in total obligations. The payroll
tax rate would instead be adjusted uniformly for everyone.
3.3 A GRADUALPHASE-INTO A FULLYFUNDEDSYSTEM
The transition path that we have analyzed in detail involves a gradual
phased introduction to the funded system over a 25-year period. The
basic idea of the phase-in is to start with PRA contributions that are 25%
of the basic amount (i.e., the amount called for in the immediate phasein described in Section 3.2) and to increase that fraction by 3 percentage
points a year until it reaches 100% at the end of 25 years.19 Thus, new
employees reaching age 30 continue to participate in the PAYGO system
for 25 years after the transition begins. Only after the 25th year of the
transition do the new 30 year olds cease to accrue PAYGO benefits and
new retirees come to depend wholly on their PRA annuities.
Note that this procedure continues to raise the same amount of
PAYGO revenue as under current law. This permits maintaining the
same benefit payments to existing retirees and the same path of the trust
fund (and therefore of the government debt) as under the existing
PAYGO program. The incremental payroll tax is fully offset by the credits
for "voluntary" contributions to the PRA accounts.
Our calculations (based on the detailed assumptions described in Section 4 of Feldstein and Samwick, 1996) indicate that in the first year of
19. Since each birth cohort pays a level percentageof its earnings,this leads to a phase-in
by birth cohort. The oldest birth cohort (those who are 64 in the first year of the
transition)contributeonly 25%of the full amount. Those who are 63 years old in the
first year contributean appropriatelyweighted averageof 25%and 28%of their earnings for two years before retiring.Those who are 62 contributeapproximately28%of
their earnings (an appropriatelyweighted average of 25%, 28%, and 31%)for the 3
years before they retire.
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this phased-in transition20 the total of all PRA contributions would be
equal to 2.00% of payroll.21
The second year of the transition differs from the first primarily in that
those who become 65 have accumulated some funds in their PRAs.22The
annuity that these PRA balances generate replaces some of the PAYGO
benefits. This in turn permits a smaller PAYGO tax.23
In each successive year, the number of retirees with PRA annuities
increases and the average size of the annuities increases because the
retirees have had more years in which to accumulate PRA balances.
The first phase of the transition is complete at the end of 25 years,
when all those reaching age 30 make the full PRA contribution and no
longer anticipate receiving any PAYGO benefits. The second phase of
the transition is complete at the end of 60 years, when all new retirees
have completely prefunded their retirement benefits and do not receive
any PAYGO benefits. The only PAYGO benefits paid after the 60th year
are to those older retirees who were more than 5 years old when the
transition began and who would therefore have earned PAYGObenefits
by the taxes they paid before the 60th year of the transition.
Despite this very long phase-in, most of the adjustment occurs in the
first 20 years. By year 19, the total of the PRA contributions and the payroll taxes required to meet PAYGO benefit obligations is less than the
12.4% payroll tax under the current PAYGOprogram.
Table 2 shows some of the key statistics at selected years from the first
year to the 75th year. The first row shows the baseline PAYGO tax rate
that would be required with no shift to prefunding. The rate continues at
12.4% until the trust fund is exhausted (in year 35) and then rises to the
level required to fund benefits in each year: 16.22% in year 55, and
18.75% in year 75.
Subsequent rows refer to the phased-in transition to the funded PRA
plan (in which each retiree receives in each year a combination of PAYGO
benefits and PRA annuity payments that together equal the benefits
provided in current law). Row 2 shows the net PAYGOtax rate needed to
20. The transitionis calibratedto actualdemographicand economicdata with 1995as the
firstyear of the transition.
21. This 2.00%includes both employerand employeecontributions;since this divisionwill
always occur and is of no real economic significance,we shall not refer to it again.
22. The requiredPAYGOtax is of course affected by demographicand income changes
from year to year.
23. As a practicalmatter, the annuity benefits after just one year of PRA contribution
would be so small relativeto the administrativecosts that it would be more sensible to
exclude everyone over some age (say 55) from participatingin the transition.To simplify the description,we do not impose any such limit.
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Table2 TRANSITIONPATHOF TAXRATES,PRACONTRIBUTIONS,
AND
BENEFITS
1

Yeari

1. Tax rate with
unfunded
systemb
2. Net tax rateb
3. PRA contribution rateb
4. Combined tax
and PRA contributionrateb
5. PRAbenefit
(billionsof
1995$)
6. Payroll/employee (thousands of 1995$)
7. Covered earnings (billions
of 1995$)

5

10

15

25

35

55

75

12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 16.22 18.75
12.40 12.35 12.12 11.62
2.00 1.85 1.69 1.57

9.23
1.48

5.29
1.62

2.77
1.93

0.20
2.02

14.40 14.20 13.81 13.18 10.71

6.91

4.69

2.23

338

813

1385

0

1

10

29

135

20.73 21.57 22.67 23.83 26.32 29.07 35.48 43.29
2927

3156

3453

3752

4273

4789

6064

7526

a1995is year 1.
bPercentof coveredearnings.

meet the concurrent PAYGO benefit obligations. The tax rate declines
gradually from 12.4% in the first year of the transition to 11.62 % in year
15 and 9.23% in year 25. By year 55, the PAYGO tax of only 2.77% of
payroll finances all of the concurrent benefit obligations. By the 75th
year, the PAYGO tax is less than 1% of payroll.
The third row shows aggregate PRA contributions as a percentage of
payroll, starting with 2.0% of covered earnings in year 1. The PRA contribution rate then declines to a low of 1.48%, reflecting changes in the
demographic composition and the number of years that individuals
have to accumulate annuity funds.24 In the long run, the PRA contribution is relatively stable at 2.02% of covered earnings.25
Row 4 combines the net PAYGO tax and the aggregate PRA contribution and shows the combined mandatory payment, starting with 14.4%
24. Twoprincipalfactorsare at workin determiningthe PRAratein each year:the phase-in
of the PRAshare from25%to 100%of the basicPRAamountraisesthe aggregatePRA,
rate while the decreasing numberof individualswho begin to participateat an older
age reduces the aggregatePRArate.
25. With the 5.4%rate of returnon the PRAaccountsthat would be possible without the
government'srebateof incrementaltax revenue, the first-yearPRAcontributionwould
be 3.93%of payroll.
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in the first year, just two percentage points of payroll more than the
current unfunded system. The excess declines gradually, and the total
mandatory payment drops below the initial 12.4% in year 19. By the 25th
year, employees are paying 1.69% of payroll less than they would with
the existing 12.4% payroll tax. The favorable difference between the tax
under the existing unfunded system (row 1) and the combined payments in the transition to the fully funded system then grows rapidly. By
year 35, the combined PAYGO tax and PRA contribution rate is just
6.91%, just slightly more than half of the PAYGO tax under the current
unfunded system.
Comparing rows 5 and 7 shows that PRA benefits are only about 1% of
covered earnings in year 15 but rise rapidly to 7% of payroll in year 35 and
18.4% of payroll in year 75, replacing virtually all the PAYGO benefits.
3.4 BEHAVIORAL
RESPONSESAND THE SIZEOF THE TAXBASE
The analysis of Table 2 does not reflect the effect of tax rates on the
amount of taxable income that individuals earn.26 The existing payroll
tax causes employees to reduce their labor supply (broadly defined to
include effort, occupational choice, and location as well as the number of
hours worked) and to substitute untaxed fringe benefits and better working conditions for taxable cash compensation. The future increase in the
payroll tax rates in the PAYGO system would cause a further reduction
in taxable payroll earnings. In contrast, the shift to a prefunded system
would reduce the tax distortion and cause a rise in taxable earnings.
We model these changes in taxable income as the product of an elasticity and the change in marginal net-of-tax wage (i.e., one minus the
effective marginal tax rate). The effective marginal tax rate in the system
includes the federal and state personal income tax rates, the effective
state and local sales tax rates, and the net payroll tax rate (including the
portion needed to offset the PRA credits). We assume (quite conservatively) a 20% rate for taxes other than the payroll tax. The net payroll tax
rate and the tax equivalence of the PRA contribution require more careful descriptions.
The net PAYGO payroll tax rate is the difference between the payroll
tax payment (12.4% until year 2030 and then the rates shown in row 1 of
Table 2) and the amount that the individual would have to pay to purchase the same benefit at the rate of return available in private pensions
or 401 (k) plans. For example, if the payroll tax payment is 12.4% but the
same benefits could be purchased in a private annuity for a premium
26. This discussion follows the analysis previously presented in Feldstein and Samwick
(1996, Section 5.3).
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equivalent to 5% of payroll, the net payroll tax is really 7.4% and the
remaining 5% can be thought of as saving.
The cost of purchasing the same benefit privately (i.e., the analogue of
the 5% in the preceding example) is calculated as follows: if the implicit
rate of return that the individual earns on the social security payroll taxes
is denoted y, a dollar of payroll tax paid at age a grows to (1 + y)65-aat age
65. If ann65(y) is the actuarial present value of a dollar a year from age 65
to death based on a return of y, the dollar of payroll tax paid at age a
earns an annuity starting at age 65 of (1 + y)65-a/ann65(y). To purchase
the same annuity with a private pension plan that earns a return of At, an
employee or employer would have to spend only [(1 + /)65- /ann
65(A/)]-1.Because pension funds do not pay tax on their income, a plausible value for ,Lis the return on capital net of corporate and property taxes
but before all personal income taxes. A pretax real return of 9% and a
corporate tax rate (including state and local property taxes) of 40% imply
-u = 5.4%; this is of course close to the 5.2% return earned on a marketweighted mix of stocks and bonds over the past four decades.
Since ut is substantially greater than y, there is a substantial effective
tax implied by the payroll tax. For example, since someone born in 1960
would receive a return on social security taxes of only y = 1.39%, each
dollar of payroll tax could be replaced by only 21.6 cents of contribution
to a private pension fund. This implies that 78.4% of the 12.4% payroll
tax is a pure tax. More generally, we define the effective net payroll tax
rate as {1 - [(1 + y)/(1 + ,u)]65-a[ann65(tu)/ann65(y)]}rp,

where rp is the

payroll tax rate (currently 0.124). Alternatively, we write the effective net
payroll tax rate as Tp - 38, where P = [(1 + y)/(l + ,6)]65-a[ann65(,)/
ann65(y)]rp is the present actual value of the benefit per dollar of incremental taxable earnings. Combining this with the marginal personal
income tax rate (0) implies a net-of-tax share under existing social secu=
rity rules of 1 - 0 - rP + /. We denote this by No. For example, with 0

0.20, y = 0.0139, and u = 0.054, the net-of-tax share for a current 35year-old is No = 0.703.

Consider now the net-of-tax share during the transition to a funded
system. An individual who earns an additional dollar of wage income in
year t must then pay, in addition to income tax at rate Ot,(1) a payroll tax
at rate rptto finance the remaining PAYGO benefit obligations and (2) a
payroll tax surcharge to offset the revenue lost because individuals reduce their payroll tax obligations by the amount of their PRA contributions. We denote the combined PAYGO tax and PRA contribution rate
(shown in row 4 of Table 2) by r*. The individual's net-of-tax share
becomes N1 = 1 - 0 - * + /3, where 3 is the same as in the current
system, since the value of the benefits is unchanged by switching to the

The Economicsof Prefunding Social Securityand MedicareBenefits ? 129

PRA system.27 When the transition to the funded system is complete and
no further PAYGO benefits are being paid, the value of rT becomes the
PRA contribution rate (which, by assumption, is constant over the working life of each birth cohort.)
We assume that taxable income responds to changes in the net-of-tax
share with an elasticity of 0.5.28 This implies that taxable income rises by
a factor of (N1 / No)05. This in turn means that the payroll tax revenue
collected at the tax rate Tpwith the initial labor supply can be collected at
a lower tax rate 'p= Tp(N1/ No)-0'5if N1 > No. Similarly the personal income
tax rate that yields the same revenue falls to 0' = 0(N1/ No)-05.
The path of the tax rates is shown in Table 3. The first two rows
compare net-of-tax shares under the existing PAYGO system (with the
tax increased to maintain benefits after the trust fund is exhausted) and
along the transition path. The next two rows show the payroll tax rates
with no behavioral response (row 3) and with the behavioral response
implied by the change in the net-of-tax share (row 4). Note that this is the
pure payroll tax (excluding the PRA surcharge) needed to maintain the
trust fund along the projected path (and at zero after it is exhausted). The
personal income tax rate with behavioral response is shown in row 5;
with no behavioral response, the rate is a constant 0.20. Row 6 shows the
combined payroll and personal tax rates and the PRA contribution.
The combination of the PRA contribution and the unchanged year-1
payroll tax causes the net-of-tax share to fall initially, and that causes
taxable earnings to decline. The effect is small and is offset by raising the
payroll tax rate from 12.40% to 12.58%. Similarly, the personal income tax
27. It is temptingto ask:"Whataboutthe high returnthatthe individualreceiveson his PRA
contribution?Doesn't that act as a negative marginaltax that should be taken into
account?Forexample, in the firstyear an individualnot only pays the PAYGOtax and
the PRAsurcharge(14.4%,shown in row 4 of table2) but also contributesan amountto
his PRAaccountwhich earnsa high 9%rateof return.Shouldn'tthis reducethe net marginal tax rate and imply a higher net-of-taxshare?"Unfortunately,the answer to this is
no. Any individualwho earnsan extra$100in yearone of the transitionpays 14.4dollars
in combinedpayrolltax and PRAcontributionbut earnsthe sameincremental
benefitsin
retirementas would be earnedunderthe existingPAYGOsystem. Thisindividual'sown
PRAcontributiondoes not affecthis benefitsbut lowersthe futurePAYGOtaxesof those
who will be workingwhen he retires.Participatingin the transitionalso means thatPRA
contributionspaid by otherswho areolderthanhe will reducehis PAYGOtaxes,but the
extent to which that happens does not depend on his own earnings.
28. The relevantelasticityis not just the traditionalelasticityof workinghours with respect
to the net-of-tax wage, but includes a broaderdefinition of labor supply (including
effort, occupation,risktaking,etc.) and the change in taxableincome that comes from
changes in the formof compensation.Althoughestimatesof this elasticitywith respect
to changes in the income tax are between 1.0 and 1.5 for high-income individuals
(Feldstein,1995a;Auten and Carroll,1994),we are dealinghere with low- and middleincome individualsand with the payrolltax ratherthan the income tax. We are therefore quite conservativeand assume an elasticityof only 0.5.
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Table3 EFFECTSOF TAXPAYER
BEHAVIORON TAXRATESAND
DEADWEIGHTLOSSa
Year"

1. Net-of-taxshare in
PAYGOsystem
2. Net-of-tax share
in transitionto
funded PRA
system
3. Payrolltax rate
with no behavioral
response
4. Payrolltax rate
with behavioral
response
5. Personalincome
tax rate with behavioralresponse
6. Combined payroll
and personal tax
rates with behavioral response plus
PRAcontribution
7. Change in deadweight loss

1

5

10

15

25

35

55

75

71.61 71.49 71.39 71.32 71.27 71.29 67.48 64.96
69.61 69.70 69.98 70.54 72.96 76.78 79.07 81.49

12.40 12.35 12.12 11.62

9.23

5.29

2.77

0.20

12.58 12.51 12.24 11.68

9.12

5.10

2.55

0.18

20.29 20.26 20.20 20.11 19.77 19.27 18.47 17.85
34.87 34.62 34.13 33.36 30.37 25.99 22.95 20.05

0.52 0.47 0.36 0.20 -0.39 -1.15 -2.58 -3.75

aPercentof coveredearnings.
bYear1 correspondsto 1995in the underlyingdemographicand economicdata.

rate only has to be raised from 20% to 20.29%. By year 20 the increased
taxable income causes the combination of the payroll tax rate (10.66%) and
the PRA contribution (1.52%) to be lower than the initial 12.4%. By year
40, the personal income tax rate is reduced from 20% to 19%. The payroll
tax rate is also reduced by one-twentieth, from 7.44% to 7.07%.
The variations in the combined rates of payroll and personal income
taxes (including the PRA contribution) cause changing distortions in
labor markets and variations in the deadweight loss of the tax system.
These changes in deadweight loss are shown in row 7 of Table 3. We
return to discuss them in Section 4.
THERATEOF RETURN,
3.5 EFFECTSON CAPITALINTENSITY,
OF INCOME
AND THEDISTRIBUTION
Before considering the welfare economics of the PRA transition and the
generational distribution of benefits and costs, we examine some of the
macroeconomic implications of the transition to a funded system. A
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common criticism of calculations of the type presented in Sections 3.3
and 3.4 is that they assume a fixed 9% marginal product of capital
(MPK), whereas the process of capital accumulation in PRA accounts
would cause the MPK to decline. We analyze that in the current section,
calculating also the effect on national income and real wages of shifting
to a funded system.
To achieve maximum transparency of this analysis, we begin by looking at the path of accumulated aggregate PRA balances on the assumption that nothing else is changed. This corresponds to the economic
assumptions implicit in Table 2. The aggregate PRA balance grows because of PRA contributions and the 9% return on the PRA balance and is
diminished by the payment of PRA annuities. Row 1 of Table 4 repeats
the aggregate PRA contribution as a percentage of covered earnings.
Row 2 shows the net flows into the PRA accounts, i.e., the difference
between contributions and PRA annuities. This net inflow declines from
the very beginning and becomes negative in the 20th year because the
earnings on the PRA balances are more than enough to achieve the
needed growth of the PRA fund. Aggregate PRA balances as a fraction of
Table4 EFFECTSOF PRAACCUMULATIONON THECAPITALSTOCK
AND THEMARGINALPRODUCTOF CAPITAL
Yeara

1

5

10

1. PRA contribu-

2.00

1.85

1.69 1.57

2.00

1.80

1.41 0.79 -1.66 -5.43 -11.48 -16.37

2

11

0.30
8.98

tions (percent
of payroll)
2. Net inflow to
PRAaccounts
(percentof payroll)
3. Aggregate PRA
balance (percent of payroll)
4. Percentageincrease in capital

25

15

41

25

35

55

75

1.48

1.62

1.93

2.02

82

123

188

230

1.63

3.70 6.07 12.14 18.20

27.82

34.04

8.89

8.76 8.61

8.26

7.94

7.49

7.22

6. Percentage in0.07
0.40
0.91 1.48
crease in real
wage rate
7. Percentage in-2.89 -2.27 -1.19 0.31
crease in real
disposable wage

2.90

4.27

6.33

7.60

5.48

12.74

25.55

36.62

stock
5. Marginal prod-

uct of capital

aYear1 correspondsto 1995in the underlyingdemographicand economicdata.
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payroll are shown in row 3, increasing from the initial 2% of payroll to
100% of payroll in year 28 and to 2.3 times payroll in the long run.
To understand the possible effect of the accumulating PRA assets on
the marginal product of capital, we calculate the percentage change in
the capital stock that would occur if the capital stock rises dollar for
dollar with the aggregate PRA balance. To estimate the baseline capital
stock under the existing PAYGO system, we assume that the current
ratio of covered earnings to GDP remains unchanged at 0.40 and that the
current ratio of the GDP to the capital stock remains unchanged at 0.37.
These assumptions imply that the baseline capital stock is 6.76 times
covered payroll. Comparing the aggregate PRA balances in row 3 with
this baseline capital stock implies the potential rise of the capital stock
shown in row 4: 12% in year 25, 28% in year 55, and an essentially stable
34% after the 75th year. With a Cobb-Douglas technology and a capital
share of 0.25, the marginal product of capital declines from 9.0% with
the existing capital stock to 8.3% in year 25, 7.5% in year 55, and 7.2% in
year 75.
Thus, even with the assumption that PRA assets add dollar for dollar to
the capital stock, the decline in the marginal product of capital in the very
long run is only from 9% to 7.2%. Substituting a 7.2% rate of return for a
9% return (for the entire transition period) only raises the long-run contribution rate from 2.02% of payroll to 3.40% of payroll, still less than onefifth of the long-run PAYGO tax rate.
The increase in the capital stock shown in row 4 and the Cobb-Douglas
technology imply that the real wage rate is 2.90% higher in year 25 and
7.6% higher in the very long run. These are shown in row 6 of Table 4.
These are of course also the proportional increases in the real GDP.
Although the assumption of the Cobb-Douglas technology implies
that the shares of capital and labor in GDP remain unchanged, there is a
substantial redistribution of capital income. All of the extra capital income is dedicated to paying retirement benefits on wages up to about
the 90th percentile of the wage distribution. The decline in the rate of
return depresses the capital income of the owners of "old capital." Since
this "old capital" is generally owned by those with higher incomes, the
shift to a funded system would involve a one-time market-driven redistribution from old-capital owners to workers and an ongoing decline in the
return that higher-income individuals get on their savings.
It is interesting to combine the real-income and tax-rate effects to
calculate the full effect of the shift to a funded system on the disposable
income of employees. With the current PAYGO system, the combination
of the 20% income tax and the long-run payroll tax of 18.75% implies
that a pretax income of 100 produces disposable income of 61.25. With
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the fully funded system, the pretax income is increased to 107.6. If the
PRA contribution of 3.40% replaces the PAYGO tax of 18.75%, disposable income rises from 61.25 to 82.45, an increase of more than onethird.29 The time path of such increases is shown in row 7 of Table 4.
Note that the assumptions of the calculation imply that the retirement
income would increase by the same proportion as the real wage, i.e., by
7.6% in the long run. It would of course be possible to reduce consumption during the working years to balance the increases in retirement and
preretirement consumption.
3.6 ENDOGENOUSRESPONSEOF PERSONALSAVINGBEHAVIOR
In the early part of the transition, individuals experience a decline in
lifetime income because the sum of the payroll tax and the PRA contribution rises while benefits remain unchanged. Later in the transition and in
the long run, individuals have higher lifetime incomes because the PRA
replaces the higher payroll tax. Traditional rational life-cycle saving behavior would imply that people respond to their reduced disposable
income by cutting saving in order to spread the reduction in consumption to retirement years.
In fact, however, American households generally do not have the
financial assets with which to reduce their saving. Even for those near
retirement, the median financial assets is less than one-half of a year's
earnings. We have therefore chosen to ignore the potential response of
saving to changes in current and future taxes.
Of course, as the transition is completed, the rise in lifetime incomes
implies that individuals would want to save more during their working
years to raise the level of retirement consumption. We also do not take
this into account.

4. TheWelfare
Economics
of Funding
SocialSecurityBenefits
When the transition from a PAYGOsystem to a funded system of financing a given set of retirement benefits has been completed, each birth
29. This calculation assumes the value of the PRA contribution that would prevail in the
long run when all PAYGO retirees are gone and when the increased capital stock
reduces the marginal product of capital to 7.2%. The corresponding figure for year 75 in
row 7 of Table 4 is based, like all of the other figures in Table 4, on the assumption of a
9% rate of return (and therefore a PRA contribution of only 2.02%.) A different possibility for year 75 would be to recognize that some PAYGObenefits must still be financed;
with a 7.2% marginal product of capital and PAYGO benefits of 0.20% of payroll, the
18.75% PAYGO tax would be replaced by a combination of PRA contribution and
PAYGO tax of 3.61%; even in this case, the real disposable income would rise by 34%.

134 *FELDSTEIN& SAMWICK
cohort is better off in two important ways. First, the PRA contributions
require a much smaller annual payment than the corresponding PAYGO
payroll tax to finance the same benefits. This is a first-order effect that
would exist even if the existing PAYGO tax did not cause a deadweight
loss by distorting economic decisions. Second, substituting the smaller
PRA contributions for the much higher PAYGO tax reduces the deadweight loss that results from distortions to labor supply and to the form
of compensation. This is also a first-order effect because the payroll tax
is incremental to the personal income tax, implying that the resulting
deadweight losses are first-order trapezoids rather than second-order
triangles.30
These permanent long-run gains are paid for in part by temporary
increases in taxes and in deadweight burdens on the birth cohorts in the
labor force during the early part of the transition. This section discusses
the path of changes in tax payments and deadweight losses and presents
alternative present-value calculations.
The dollar values of the annual changes in the deadweight loss are
estimated using the traditional Harberger-Browning approximation:
ADWL = 0.5E(t2- t2)(1 - to)-1E,where E is the current payroll tax base, to
= 1 - No = 0 + T - 3 (the marginal tax rate with the existing system),
and tl = 1 - N1 = 0 + * - / (the marginal tax rate with the PRA system
and in the transition). These values are presented in row 7 of Table 3.
At first, the increase in the combined payroll tax and PRA contribution
raises the annual deadweight loss of the tax system. In the first year, the
increase is 0.52% of covered wages. Individuals are thus worse off in the
first year, both because they are paying 2.00% of their wages in additional mandatory contributions (as shown in row 3 of Table 2) and because doing so increases the deadweight loss by 0.52% of payroll. The
PRA surcharge and the deadweight loss then decline rapidly. The extra
deadweight loss is halved by year 13 and is completely gone by year 18.
By year 25, the lower combined value of the payroll tax and the PRA
contribution (e = 0.1071 as shown in row 4 of Table 2, instead of Tp=
0.124) reduces the year's deadweight loss of the tax system by 0.39% of
covered wages; the individuals' total burden in financing retirement
consumption is thus down by 2.08% of covered wages.
30. There is a third effect on employees: the increasedcapitalstock that results from the
accumulatingPRAbalancesraises the marginalproductof laborand thereforethe real
wage of employees. However, since this is (to a first-orderapproximation)balancedby
a decline in the returnon the existingcapitalstock, we ignorethis rise in wage income.
More formally,with no induced changein laborin each yearY = f(K,L)implies dY = fK
dK = r dK. Allowing for second-ordereffects (on factorprices)implies dY = r dK + K
dr + L dw, since dL = 0. Thus L dw = -K dr, and these two effects can be ignored in
evaluatingthe change in nationalincome.
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By year 55, the combination of the payroll tax and the PRA contribution is down to just 4.69% (vs. an otherwise required PAYGO contribution in that year of 16.22%), and the resulting reduction in the deadweight loss is 2.58% of earnings, implying a total reduction in the net
burden equal to 14.11% of wages.
Note particularly that by the 75th year the total cost of financing the
retirement benefits is only 2.23% of wages, while the reduced deadweight loss associated with the reduced cost of financing is 3.75% of
wages. Thus the reduced deadweight loss is more than enough to pay
for the entire PRA contribution. The net gain to the individual is thus
more than 20% of covered payroll: the shift from the 18.75% projected
payroll tax to the combined payroll tax residual (of 0.20% of payroll) and
the PRA contribution (of 2.02%), a gain of 16.52% of payroll, plus the
associated 3.75%-of-payroll reduction in the deadweight loss associated
with labor-market distortions.
Table 5 shows the estimated present values of the gains from shifting
to funded retirement benefits. The analysis distinguishes the present
value of the reduced tax and PRA contributions (row 1) and the reduced
deadweight loss (row 2). The present-value calculations take into account not only the difference in the tax rate (Tp- rp) but also the growing
level of taxable earnings (E). Thus the present value of the increased
spendable income that results from the transition to a funded system
with unchanged

benefits is

I(Tp

- rT)Et(1 + 8)-, where Et is the level of

aggregate taxable earnings and 8 is the discount rate. Similarly the present value of the changes in the deadweight losses is X ADWLt (1 +
48)t,
Table5 PRESENTVALUEOF DEADWEIGHT
LOSSREDUCTIONS
2%

Discountrate
Years

1-75

75+

3%
All

1-75

75+

4%
All

1-75

75+

All

Billionsof 1995$
1. Reduced tax 10,385 32,672 43,057 5,890 7,518 13,408 3,344 2,410 5,754
2. Reduced
2,343 8,104 10,447 1,324 1,865 3,189 746 598 1,344
DWL
3. Total gain 12,728 40,776 53,504 7,214 9,383 16,597 4,090 3,007 7,097
Percentof 1995coveredwages
1. Reduced tax
2. Reduced

DWL
3. Totalgain

355

1116

1471

201

257

458

114

82

196

80

277

357

45

64

109

25

20

45

435

1393

1828

246

321

567

139

103

242
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where the annual change in the deadweight loss [ADWL = 0.5E(t0 - t2)
(1 - to)-1E]is discussed above. The discounting is to 1995, the first year of
the transition, and the discounted values are stated both in 1995 dollars
and as percentages of covered earnings in 1995.
The appropriate rate of discount should reflect the rate at which the
marginal utility of additional consumer income declines over time as
incomes rise. A projection that real per capita income will rise at about
1% a year suggests a discount rate of 2% (if the elasticity of the marginal
utility function is taken to be 2) or 3% (if the elasticity of the marginal
utility function is taken to be 3). Results are also presented in Table 5 for
a discount rate of 4%.31

Although numerical simulation results are available for only 75 years,
the gain from shifting to a funded program continues beyond that time.
Without the shift, the heavy burden of financing retirement income by a
high payroll tax and the associated deadweight loss would continue indefinitely. To estimate the present value of the gain associated with the
period after the first 75 years, we assume that without the shift the
PAYGOtax rate projected for year 75 under the existing system (18.75% of
covered wages) would continue indefinitely after that date, whereas with
the shift to a funded system the benefits after year 75 would continue to
be financed with a PRA contribution of 2.02% of covered wages (the
projected value for year 75). If aggregate wages grow at g% a year after
year 75 and the benefits of funding are discounted at rate 8, the present
value of the reduced payments is

Vl = (1 + s)-74(r- r)E75

(

+

,

(4.1)

where the summation is from t = 1 to t = oo,Tpis the long-run PAYGOtax
rate of 18.75%, rp is the long-run PRA contribution rate of 2.02%, and E75
is the aggregate level of covered wages in year 75 ($7526 billion in 1995
dollars). Similarly, the present value of the deadweight loss reductions
after year 75 is
V2 = (1 + 8)-740.5s(-t)

(1 - to)-'E7s

(

).

(4.2)

31. A discount rate of 4%would of course correspondto a marginal-utilityelasticityof 2 if
the rate of growth of real per capitaincome were 2. Although this was the case in the
past and frequentlyled to the choice of a discountrateof 4%,the lower realgrowthrate
now projectedfor the future implies that the discount rate should be reducedaccordingly. See footnote 13.
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Using the social security actuaries' prediction that the growth rate of
aggregate wages in the middle of the twenty-first century will be only
about 1.1% a year implies the Vl-values shown in row 1 of Table 5.
With the 3% discount rate, the overall present-value gain from shifting
to a funded system is $16.6 trillion at 1995 prices. Most of this net gain
(about 80%) is the result of the "reduced tax" (i.e., reduced cost of
funding retirement benefits), and the remainder is the reduction in the
deadweight loss. About half of the present-value gain is associated with
the first 75 years, and the remainder with the years that follow. A 4%
discount rate cuts the gain from funding approximately in half but still
leaves a very large $7.1 trillion present-value gain, with 60% of that gain
in the first 75 years. As the discount rate approaches the growth rate, the
gain becomes explosively large; this is seen with a discount rate of 2%,
implying a welfare gain from funding of more than $50 trillion.
The important implication of these calculations is that even though the
combined payroll tax and PRA contributions have to rise in the early
decades of the transition, the present value of the net gains and losses is
clearly a very substantial positive number.

5. Net Gainsby BirthCohortandthePossibilityofa
Transition
Pareto-Improving
The essential feature of the transition to a funded program of retirement
benefits is a period of reduced consumption by employees during the
early years of the transition so that a dedicated capital stock can be
accumulated. This dedicated capital is then used to finance retirement
benefits, thereby permitting lower taxes and more consumption by employees in later years.
With the specific very gradual transition path studied in Sections 3
and 4, the combination of the PRA contributions and the payroll taxes
remains higher than the 12.4% payroll tax rate in the pure PAYGO program for 18 years. Anyone who is at least 47 years old when the transition begins will pay more under our calculations than he would with the
existing PAYGO system.32
For younger cohorts, there will initially be higher taxes-plus-PRA contributions followed by lower tax payments. These changes in tax rates
affect real incomes directly and also by the associated changes in dead32. This rests on the criticalassumption that if the PAYGOsystem continues there would
be no adjustmentin taxes during the next 18 years and no reductionin benefits after
that time, but an increasein taxes (after2030)to maintainthe existingbenefit rules. If
either assumption is violated, individualswho are 47 years old or older may be better
off with the PRAtransitionthan in the pure PAYGOsystem.
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weight losses. The time path of net losses followed by net gains is presented in Table 6 for three age cohorts, identified by their age in the first
year of the transition (1995). Each figure in the table shows the net gain
or loss, including the associated change in deadweight loss, as a percentage of taxable wages. The 55-year-olds have a small net loss in each
preretirement year. The 40-year-olds have gradually decreasing losses
for 18 years and then gradually increasing gains. The 25-year-olds are
required to pay a higher payroll tax in the early years even though they
are not making PRA contributions until the fifth year. After 18 years of
higher contributions they enjoy the benefit of rising gains that reach
more than 8% of their wages before they finally retire at age 65.
Although the shift to a funded system is unambiguously a bad deal for
the 55-year-olds (assuming that the alternative is to leave taxes and
benefits unchanged until 2030), the effect for the other age cohorts depends on the rate at which they discount future real income changes.
Table 7 presents the actuarial present values of the net gains for birth
groups classified by their age at the time that the transition begins.
Results are presented for four real discount rates from zero through 6%.
The first part of the table (rows 1 through 3) shows the actuarial present
values in thousands of 1995 dollars. The second part of the table restates
those present values as percentages of the present actuarial value of the
individual's future earnings.
Except for those who are too young to be working when the transition
begins, the effect of the shift to a funded system is relatively small. With
a discount rate of 4%, the present actuarial value of the net loss is
greatest for the 40-year-olds, but their lifetime loss (expressed as an
actuarial present value) is only about $5000, or about 1.3% of their future
wage income. For the very young, the favorable changes are much
larger: with a 4% discount rate, the net gain to those who are 10 when
the transition begins has a present actuarial value of $15,230, or about
4.3% of future wages.
Although those who are 40 or older are net losers in the transition, the
AGECOHORTS
Table6 TIMEPATHOF NET GAINSBYDIFFERENT
Age in first year
Yeara1
of transition
55
40
25
aYear 1 is 1995.

-2.44
-2.52
-2.62

5
-2.17
-2.25
-2.36

Percentageof coveredearnings
25
20
30
10
15
-1.68
-1.75
-1.79

0
-0.96
-0.99

0
0.27
0.28

0
0
1.99 0
2.06 4.23

35

40

0
0
6.45

0
0
8.62
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Table7 ACTUARIALPRESENTVALUESOF NETGAINSBYAGEAT THE
STARTOF THETRANSITION
Age at
start:

Present value
5

10

15

20

25

30

40

50

55

60

-4.06

-2.09

Thousandsof dollarsper worker($1995)
Discount rate (%)
0

2
4
6

104.85 77.27 53.03 32.33

16.37

4.97 -5.79

-5.73

43.37 33.70 23.81 14.11 6.40 0.58 -5.46 -5.13 -3.75 -2.01
18.88 15.23 10.73 5.54 1.51 -1.61 -5.09 -4.64 -3.49 -1.94
8.64 7.10 4.73 1.47 -0.88 -2.65 -4.73 -4.22 -3.25 -1.87
Percent of future wages (actuarialpresent value)

Discount rate (%)

0
2
4
6

8.28 6.40 4.60 2.93 1.65 0.58 -1.01
7.20 5.31 3.57 2.00 0.95 0.09 -1.18
6.15 4.28 2.60 1.16 0.31 -0.34 -1.34
5.19 3.35 1.75 0.43 -0.24 -0.72 -1.49

-1.87
-1.91
-1.95
-1.98

-2.11
-2.13
-2.14
-2.15

-2.28
-2.28
-2.28
-2.28

result is quite different if we look at the nuclear family. Combining a
husband and wife age 40 with two children below age 20 shows a very
large gain to the family.
5.1 THEPOSSIBILITY
OF A PARETO-EFFICIENT
TRANSITIONTO
A FUNDEDSYSTEM
Different phase-in schedules can reduce the number of age groups that
are net losers; the simplest example is a transition that leaves employees
over some age in the existing PAYGO system. A more interesting question is whether it is possible to structure the transition in such a way that
all cohorts gain.
The difficult problem in designing a Pareto-improving transition to a
funded system is to accumulate funds that can be used to finance future
retirement benefits (and therefore to reduce the future PAYGOtax) without making at least one birth cohort permanently worse off in the process. The following example shows that it may be possible to have such a
Pareto-efficient transition to a fully funded program. This transition path
is not put forward as optimal or as better than the basic example of
Section 3, or even as a realistic option, but only to show that a Paretoefficient transition is theoretically feasible.33
33. We are grateful to Antonio Rangel for discussions about the feasibility of Paretoimprovingtransitionsto funded social security.
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For this analysis we make the empirically plausible assumption that
individuals do no discretionary saving or that any such saving is not
altered by the transition to a funded program.34 Individuals over age 40
when the transition begins remain in the original PAYGO program and
are completely unaffected by the transition. Each individual employee
who reaches age 40 is given the option of contributing 5% of earnings to
a PRA for 10 years in addition to the ordinary payroll tax. The funds earn
a 9% real rate. At the end of the 10 years, when the individual reaches
age 50, the individual stops making PRA contributions. Ninety percent
of the accumulated PRA balance is then used to fund an annuity over the
next 15 years (from ages 50 through 64) with which to reduce the individual's PAYGO taxes. The remaining 10% of the fund is retained and used
to finance retirement benefits for the individual. The PAYGO benefits
that the individual receives are reduced by the amount of these PRA
benefits so that his income in retirement is unaffected.
Note first that no one is worse off. Those who choose to participate are
clearly better off, since they have voluntarily chosen to do so (because
the 9% return exceeds their personal discount rate as well as the net-oftax market rate of return that they could otherwise get). Those individuals who are working after the first cohort of 40-year-olds retires are also
better off, since their PAYGO taxes can be smaller (because the new
retirees use the residual 10% of their PRA balances to finance retirement
annuities that reduce their dependence on PAYGObenefits).
The ability to achieve a Pareto improvement comes in this example
from the fact that there is initially a tax on investment income that causes
individuals to receive a real rate of return that is less than 9% and that
the prefunding of social security benefits permits circumventing this
distortionary tax.35Although it might be objected that the mechanism of
this example rests on the assumption that individuals will not offset their
PRA saving by other dissaving, we believe that dissaving such large
amounts is virtually impossible for most individuals.36 The transition
34. Recall that median financial assets of households in their immediate preretirement
years are equal to only about six months of income. Such smallbalancesaremost likely
to be regardedas precautionarysavings.
35. Readerswho are familiarwith the recent papers of LaurenceKotlikoffon privatizing
social security (e.g., Kotlikoff,1996a,1996b)will recognizethat his examples of social
securityprivatizationsthat produce Paretoimprovementsget those gains by replacing
a distortionarytax (in his case the payrolltax)with a less distortionaryone (a consumption tax that raises a substantialamount of revenue duringthe transitionby taxingold
capital,i.e., by a lump-sumwealth tax).
36. See footnote 34. Antonio Rangel has suggested a modificationof our example that
would also lead to a Paretoimprovementeven if individualsare savers who could in
principle offset the mandatory PRA accumulationwith reductions in other saving.
Rangel's solution to this problem is to replace the 10%-of-payrollPRA contribution
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implied by this example is extremely slow, and more rapid transitions
that made no cohort worse off could no doubt be devised. It is not clear,
however, that doing so would be more desirable than a transition with a
greater net welfare gain that is not Pareto-efficient.

6. RecognitionBondsandAlternativeTransition
Financing
The use of recognitionbondsis an alternative administrative mechanism to
the gradual transition described in this paper. It is part of a broader class
of transition mechanisms that combine the gradual transition of the type
modeled in Section 3.3 with the use of government debt to shift the
burden of the transition to the more distant future.
A recognition bond is a government bond given to employees at the
time that a PAYGO social security program is terminated as compensation for the loss of future benefits or as compensation for the PAYGO
taxes that these individuals previously paid. The concept was first suggested by James Buchanan and has actually been used in Chile and
Argentina.
Unlike the gradual transition of Section 3.3, the existing PAYGOsystem
could be ended completely and replaced with an exclusively funded system. Individuals would then be given recognition bonds with which they
could in principle purchase (from a private financial institution) a singlepremium annuity that would begin its payments at age 65. The most
natural definition of an appropriate recognition bond would be one that is
equal to the present actuarial value of the benefits to which the individual
is entitled under the PAYGO system. If the value of such a recognition
bond were calculated by discounting future benefits at the same rate at
which the market is willing to sell a single-premium annuity, the recognition bond would permit the individual to receive the same benefits that he
or she would get from the existing PAYGO program.
Three further requirements would make the recognition-bond approach exactly identical to the gradual transition of Section 4. First, each
individual would be required to purchase such an annuity. Second, the
with an offerby the governmentto permitindividualsto receivea 9%rateof returnon
saving in excess of what they would otherwisehave done. In practice,there would be
problemsof dealing with previouslyaccumulatedassets as well as annualsaving flows.
Samwick (1996) simulates the effects of several reforms in which households buy
themselves out of their existing PAYGOobligationswith contributionsto PRAs. As in
Rangel'sexample, the reductionin the PAYGOtax is a convex functionof the amount
contributed. Samwick shows that governments will typicallyfind it optimal to offer
differentschedules simultaneouslyto those for whom socialsecuritycontributionsare
marginaland inframarginalin order to maximizeparticipationwhile minimizingthe
reductionin other saving that may occur.
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individual would be required to make the same contribution to a PRA as
provided in Section 4, so that the combination of the PRA annuity and
the recognition-bond annuity exactly replaced the original PAYGObenefits. Third, a payroll tax at the same annual rates as used in the Section 4
transition would be used to finance the principal and interest payments
on the recognition bonds.
These equivalence requirements indicate some alternative transition
paths that could be achieved with the help of recognition bonds or, more
generally, with the use of explicit government debt as part of the transition. For example, the government could shift some of the burden of the
transition from the initial generation of employees to future employees
by borrowing some of the funds needed to meet the PAYGObenefits and
then amortizing that debt very slowly or not at all. An additional opportunity presented by recognition bonds or by other government debt is to
substitute the personal income tax or some other tax for the payroll tax in
servicing the explicit debt.
In considering the possible role of explicit government debt it is important to recognize the true cost of using government borrowing. Although government borrowing may appear to have only a low cost
because of the low interest rate that the government pays, the crowding
out of private investment by government borrowing precludes investments that would be expected to earn the 9% real rate of return. We shall
not examine the possible uses of debt further at this time.
Table 8 presents estimates of the value of recognition bonds for the
United States as of 1995. The table shows the value of the bonds that
would be payable to individuals at selected ages from 30 through 75 (in
thousands of 1995 dollars) as well as the aggregate value of the bonds (in
trillions of 1995 dollars). The first four columns are based on a real
interest rate of 2%, essentially the real rate of interest paid on government bonds during the past four decades. The second four columns are
based on a real interest rate of 4%.
The recognition-bond values in column 1 are the accumulated value of
past payroll tax payments. Thus the average 45-year-old in 1995 had paid
(together with his employers) taxes which, when accumulated with interest at 2%, had a cumulated value of $63,830. The aggregate value of the
claims of all current employees calculated in this way is $6.703 trillion. For
retirees we cumulate the taxes that they and their employers paid and
subtract the benefits that they are deemed to have received after age 64.
The aggregate value of the remaining claims of the retirees is an additional $1.390 trillion. The total value of the potential recognition bonds
calculated in this way is thus $8.094 trillion. Using a 4% rate to cumulate

Table 8 BACKWARD-LOOKING AND FORWARD-LOOKING RECOGNITION B
Value of Bond ($)
Interest rate 2%

Age

Backwardlooking
bond

30
45
60
75

19,950
63,830
94,980
3,270

Interest rate
Forward-lookingbond

Gross
SSW
98,580
120,060
157,870
72,460

SS tax
79,190
45,860
10,980
0

Net
SSW
19,390
74,200
146,890
72,460

kwd
looking
bond
21,540
78,920
133,540
48,830

Totals in trillions of 1995 dollars
Workers
Retirees
Total

6.703
1.390
8.094

16.317
3.631
19.948

7.949
0
7.949

aExcludes individuals with negative net social security wealth.

8.369
3.630
11.999

8.474
2.785
11.259

4
6
11
6

144 FELDSTEIN& SAMWICK
past taxes (net of the benefits received by current retirees) produces a
total recognition-bond debt of $11.259 trillion (shown in column 5).
The alternative to this backward-looking recognition bond is a forwardlooking recognition bond based on the net future benefits to which the
individuals are entitled on the basis of the taxes that they have already
paid. Our calculation applies the cohort-specific PAYGO rate of return
(see footnote 18 above) to the taxes that the individuals in that cohort
would pay to calculate the benefits to which they would be entitled in
retirement. The present actuarial value of those benefits is the gross social
security wealth shown in column 2. The individuals who are 45 years old
in 1995 are entitled to benefits under current law that have an actuarial
present value of $120,060 when discounted at 2%. However, before retiring they would pay additional taxes with an actuarial present value of
$45,860. Their net social security wealth is thus $74,200, and that would
be the appropriate value of the forward-looking recognition bond. The
cumulative value of such net social security forward-looking recognition
bonds, when discounting at 2%, is $11.999 trillion. That this amount is
larger than the aggregate of backward-looking recognition bonds shows
that the current generation of employees and retirees can expect to receive a real return greater than 2% in the existing program. A more
detailed comparison by age shows that this is only true above a certain
age, with those in their early thirties or younger receiving a real return of
less than 2%.
Applying a 4% discount rate to calculate forward-looking recognition
bonds gives a very different result. No working age cohort can expect to
receive a real return as high as 4%. Individuals who are less than 35
years old have negative net social security wealth (the present value of
their future taxes exceeds the present value of the benefits when discounted at 4%) and would receive no recognition bonds. The aggregate
value of the forward-looking recognition bonds paid to the remaining
workers and retirees would be only $3.838 trillion, about half the value
of the backward-looking recognition bonds calculated with a 4% rate of
interest.

Workers
7. SocialSecurityPrefunding
andLow-Wage
The prefunded system of benefits based on individual accounts that is
described in Section 3 involves no redistributions and makes retirement
annuities proportional to pre6etirement earnings. It is possible however
to introduce a variety of modifications that can make prefunding even
more advantageous to low-wage workers than to those with average and
above-average wages.
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In a previous paper (Feldstein and Samwick, 1996) we used data on
the distribution of lifetime earnings to calculate the distribution of PRA
fund values at age 65. We found that 19% of accounts had less than half
of the value of the median account. The cost of supplementing all such
low-value accounts by enough to bring them up to half of the median
value could be financed by a one-time tax of 4.7% on all PRA accounts at
age 65. Each individual could save enough to provide for his own PRA
annuity and to finance that one-time tax by raising his PRA contribution
rate by 4.7%; in the current calculation, the long-run PRA contribution
would have to rise from 2.02% to 2.1% of payroll.
In the present paper we pursue a very different approach and ask how
a low-income worker might fare in a funded system and what would
have to be done to provide the same level of retirement benefits that
such workers receive in the existing PAYGO system. For this purpose,
we follow the Social Security Administration and define a low-wage
worker as someone with 45% of average covered earnings, i.e., with
earnings of only $11,617 in 1996. Under current law, such individuals
receive benefits equal to 55% of their immediate preretirement income if
they have no dependents and 83% of that preretirement income with a
dependent spouse.
Consider first the fraction of earnings that such a low-wage worker
would have to contribute to a PRA account from ages 30 to 65 to finance
an annuity equal to 83% of preretirement earnings from age 65 to death.
To provide an explicit and transparent calculation, we avoid the complexity of an actuarial annuity and assume instead that the individual receives a fixed annuity for 20 years starting at age 65. If the low-income
individual's wage grows at 1% a year from age 30 to age 64 and the PRA
account earns a real return of 9%, the value of the PRA account at age 65
is cw 135(1.01)'(1.09)35-t, where c is the proportion of the wage that is
saved in the PRA each year and w is the wage at age 30. If the annuity is
to be 83% of the immediate preretirement wage, i.e., 0.83w(1.01)35,for 20
years, the value of c must satisfy c L5(1.01)t(1.09)35- = 0.83(1.01)35
120(1.09)-t. This implies c = 0.045. Thus even with no redistribution, the
low-wage earner could obtain the 83% replacement rate of the current
PAYGO system with a PRA contribution of only 4.5% of wages instead of
the 18.75% long-term contribution implied by current law and PAYGO
financing. The low-wage earner would thus have an increase in disposable income equal to more than 14% of earnings.
The idea that the low-wage workers would be required to make higher
proportional contributions to their PRAs than higher-wage workers
might be politically unacceptable even though such contributions would
be very much less than they would have been in the PAYGOsystem. We
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therefore ask how their rate of return would have to be augmented by an
explicit transfer to produce the 83% replacement rate if the low-wage
worker made the same PRA contribution as a percent of payroll as everyone else. This incremental return might come from the additional
corporate-income-tax revenue that the government collects as a result of
the PRA capital by giving more of that extra tax to lower-income individuals and less to those with higher incomes.
If the low wage earner contributes 2% of earnings to a PRA and obtains a return of R% on his PRA balances, at the time of retirement the
balance in the account would be 0.02w ;35(1.01)t(1 + R)35-t. If benefits are
to be 0.83(1.01)35wfor 20 years, R must satisfy 0.02w,35(1.01)t (1 + R)35-t=
0.83(1.01)w35w1(l + R)-t. This implies that the required rate of return for
the low wage earner would be R = 0.118. In short, if the government
used part of the incremental corporate income tax revenue (equal to
about 3.5% of all PRA assets) to increase the rate of return on the assets
of the low-wage earners by 2.8 percentage points, the low-income earner
could obtain the same 83% replacement rate as under existing law with a
contribution of only 2% of earnings.
There are undoubtedly other and better ways to achieve any desired
redistribution to supplement the benefits of low-wage earners. Although
we will not explore this issue further here, we believe that the calculations in this section show that a prefunded system can provide the same
level of retirement income to low-wage earners as the current PAYGO
system with at least 14% higher income during preretirement years or
some combination of higher income during both retirement and preretirement years.

8. Medicare
Although we have focused our detailed analysis on the prefunding of
social security benefits, we believe that the same logic can be applied to
financing the healthcare benefits of the aged. As we noted in Section 1,
the cost of funding healthcare for the aged on a PAYGO basis would
eventually require a payroll tax equal to about 12% of GDP, or about 30%
of covered earnings.
Since the long-run projected cost of the healthcare programs for the
aged is about 170% of the long-run level of aggregate social security benefits, a first approximation of the payroll contributions needed to fund
these health benefits is 170% of the PRA contributions that are required to
fund the social security retirement benefits. This implies contributions to
a personalretirementhealthaccount (PRHA) of 3.4% of taxable payroll. The
funds accumulated in this way could be used to purchase conventional
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insurance like the existing Medicare coverage plus the long-term care
insurance currently provided by Medicaid. Alternatively, the funds could
pay for membership in a health maintenance organization or could be
used in conjunction with high-deductible health insurance policies as a
way of achieving greater self-control over health expenditures. Although
the precise way in which the accumulated funds are translated into the
financing of healthcare is very important, it is secondary to the financing
issue that we consider here.
One further point that does need discussion here is that the health
benefits provided by Medicare, unlike the cash retirement benefits, are
not related to earnings during working years. The 3.4% of payroll contribution to a PRHA would therefore provide a larger than needed fund for
those with above-average earnings but an inadequate fund for those
with below-average earnings. One possible solution to this problem is to
redistribute the contribution so that each individual pays 3.4% of his
earnings up to the maximum taxable earnings for social security ($65,400
at 1997 levels) but only keeps (or receives) enough to contribute the same
average amount to a PRHA (i.e., an amount equal to 3.4% of average
covered earnings, about $25,900 at the 1997 level).

9. ConcludingRemarks
Designing an appropriate way to finance the retirement and healthcare
benefits of the aging population is probably the most important challenge to government finance in the decades ahead. If it is done wisely,
the aged will have comfortable retirements and the advantages of improving medical technology while the working population will avoid the
explosive growth of taxes that could otherwise occur.
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Comment
S. RAO AIYAGARI
Universityof Rochester

1. Introduction
Feldstein and Samwick conclude that a transition to a fully funded social
security system is likely to have significant benefits to future generations
while imposing fairly low costs on transition generations. In my discussion I will first start with a simple overview and then consider a variety
of issues not addressed adequately in the paper. My conclusion is that
the case for making a transition to a fully funded system may not be as
compelling as Feldstein and Samwick suggest and that further quantita-
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tive analysis to address the issues I discuss would be very helpful in
evaluating the merits of the authors' suggestion.

2. SimpleOverview
Let's start with the steady state of a simple Diamond (1965) overlapping
generations (OG) model with a pay-as-you-go social security system in
which the return to capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy. Consider the following policy of transiting to a fully funded system in which
benefits to the current old are maintained (paid for by taxes on current
young) but all future benefits and future taxes are eliminated. In the long
run this implies an increase in the wealth of future generations, since the
return on capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy. Consequently,
the direct wealth effect is welfare-increasing for future (long-run) generations. For the transition generation (the current young), however, there
is a decrease in wealth, since they suffer an elimination of benefits but
no reduction in taxes. Therefore, the direct wealth effect is welfaredecreasing for the transition generation.
In addition to the direct wealth effects there are also indirect effects.
These arise because there will be an increase in saving by both the future
generations and the transition generation. For the future generations
there will be an increase in current consumption, which will be less than
the increase in current disposable income; and for the transition generation there will be a decrease in current consumption with no change in
current disposable income. These effects raise the capital stock, increase
the real wage, and decrease the return to capital.
The welfare consequences of the indirect effects on future generations are ambiguous. For the transition generations, at least for those
close to retirement, the indirect effect is a further decrease in welfare.
For those transition generations far from retirement the indirect welfare
effect is again ambiguous. However, for empirically plausible parameter values the overall welfare effect on future generations is significantly positive (see Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser-hereafter KSW1996).

3. Discussion
In my discussion I will question the possible long-run benefits and also
question the political feasibility of the transition. My discussion will
focus on the following points: (1) risky returns on capital, (2) heterogeneity in portfolios and wealth, (3) Pareto improvement and capital taxation,
(4) altruistic bequests; and (5) political economy considerations.
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3.1 RISKYRETURNSON CAPITAL

The return to capitalis, of course, highly risky.This factimplies that one
has to consider the appropriaterisk characteristicsof the social security
program and use the appropriatecontingent claims prices to evaluate
whether a change in the programincreases or decreases wealth. If the
taxes and benefits associated with the social security programare riskless, as is commonly modeled, then it is inappropriateto use the expected return on capital as measured by the expected return on the
marketportfolioto calculatethe wealth effect of eliminatingthe program.
The correctprocedureis to use the appropriaterisk-freerate. Forevaluating the wealth effect of changes in social securitytaxes and benefits, it is
probably reasonable to use some estimate of a long-term risk-freerate.
Historicalex post real returns on long-term U.S. government bonds are
close to zero, which is significantly below the expected return on the
marketportfolio. Recently,the U.S. government has startedissuing tenyear indexed bonds with a real return slightly above 3% per annum.
Therefore,it seems likely that the long term risk-freerate in the U.S. is
not only significantlybelow the expected returnon the marketportfolio
but also about the same or perhaps somewhat less than the average
growth rate of the U.S. economy.1This means that even in the long run,
generationsthat are born when the risk-freerateis above the growth rate
of the economy will experience an increase in wealth, whereas generations that are born in periods when the risk-freerateis below the growth
rate will experience a decrease in wealth. Since, on average the risk-free
rate is about the same as or less than the growth rate, about as many
future generations are likely to lose as are likely to gain by eliminating
social security.
The above discussion is not meant to suggest that the taxes and benefits associated with the social security programare completely riskless.
However, so long as the risks are uncorrelatedwith the return on the
market portfolio, it is not inappropriateto use some estimate of a longterm risk-freerate. Of course, if the risks are correlated,then it is a more
complicated task to evaluate the wealth effect of a change in the social
security program. This is an issue that bears furtherscrutiny.
In this connection one should comment on the authors' assumption
that the long-run growth rate of real wages (which is the base of social
security taxes) is about 1.1%per annum. This is significantlylower than
the long-run growth rate of real GDP,which is in the range of 2-3% per
annum. The lower growth rate for real wages assumed by the authors
1. This situation can be quite consistent with dynamic efficiency. See Aiyagari and Peled
(1991), Manuelli (1990), and Abel et al. (1989).
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probably reflects several factors, including the discrepancy between covered wages and total wages, the widening skill premium, and the increasing ratio of benefits to wages. Nevertheless, as a steady-state assumption it seems more appropriate to assume that the growth rate of
real wages will be in line with the growth rate of real GDP. This makes
the comparison of the risk-free rate with the growth rate more damaging
to the authors' calculation of the direct wealth effect of a change in the
social security program.
The authors do consider the issue of the riskiness of the return to
capital in discussing their proposal for prefunding social security benefits. Initially, the authors suggest that workers be made to save a part of
their earnings that is just sufficient to replace their social security benefits, assuming that these savings earn the expected return on the market
portfolio. Later, in recognition of the riskiness of the return on the market portfolio, they suggest that workers be made to save a somewhat
larger amount, enough to replace their social security benefits with a
probability of at least 97%. In my opinion these calculations are misleading. To see this, consider how a generation which is saving more due to
the elimination of social security taxes and benefits should allocate those
extra savings between risk-free bonds and risky capital. If the risk-free
rate equals the growth rate, then this generation should put all of its
extra savings into risk-free bonds. If the risk-free rate is somewhat above
the growth rate, then it should allocate most of its savings to risk-free
bonds and a small portion to risky capital. If the risk-free rate is less than
the growth rate, then it should actually sell some claims to capital and
allocate more than its extra savings to risk-free bonds. That is, when the
risk-free rate is about the same as the growth rate, it is never optimal for
a generation to allocate all of the extra savings to risky capital. Further,
my previous argument says that a generation born in a period when the
risk-free rate is less than the growth rate will lose even if it chooses to
allocate its extra savings optimally betweenrisk-freebonds and capital. Therefore, allocating its portfolio in the manner suggested by the authors will
likely result in a further welfare loss. Such behavior can likely lead to a
welfare loss even for generations born in periods when the risk-free rate
is somewhat above the growth rate, even though the direct wealth effect
is positive.
The authors' 97% criterion also ignores the potential for enormous
losses that can result from investing solely in a risky portfolio. It's not
enough to consider just the probability of a loss; its extent is also relevant
for risk-averse investors. The fact that over a long horizon stocks are
almost guaranteed to outperform bonds does not imply that one should
invest exclusively in stocks. This point goes back to Samuelson (1979)
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and is illustrated by the following calculations taken from a recent paper
by Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996). Consider an investor with a
relative risk aversion coefficient of 5 and a horizon of 40 years who can
choose between stocks and risk-free bonds. Over that horizon stocks will
outperform bonds with a probability greater then 97%. Yet, the optimal
portfolio for such an investor consists of 60% bonds and 40% stocks.
More interestingly, such an investor will prefer $1 in the optimal portfolio to $3.86 in a stocks-only portfolio. Even more interestingly, such an
investor will prefer $1 in a bonds-only portfolio to $2.22 in a stocks-only
portfolio. Loss probability is not an adequate measure of risk.2
Taking account of individual risk and its possible dependence on aggregate shocks along the lines suggested by Mankiw (1986) and Constantinides and Duffie (1996) suggests that stocks may be even more risky.
3.2 HETEROGENEITY
IN PORTFOLIOS
AND RETURNS
Do a lot of people for whom social security is important earn the high
expected return on capital in their portfolios that the authors assume in
their calculations? As is well known, there is considerable heterogeneity
in wealth, even among members of a given age cohort. Associated with
this is considerable heterogeneity in portfolios and returns. Essentially,
people at the lower end of the wealth distribution hold low-risk, lowreturn portfolios, and people at the upper end of the wealth distribution
hold higher-risk, higher-return portfolios. For example, according to
U.S. data for 1983 summarized in Kessler and Wolff (1991), people in the
lowest quintile of the wealth distribution held 82% of their portfolio in
currency and demand and time deposits, 9% in financial securities and
corporate stock, 6% in owner-occupied housing, and 3% in other real
estate and unincorporated business. So it seems to me that people for
whom social security is likely to be important are earning returns much
below the expected return on capital and probably more in line with the
risk-free rate and the growth rate. Some part of this may be due to lack of
financial sophistication, but I suspect that a large part of it has to do with
precautionary and liquidity motives which cause these households to
prefer low-risk, low-return portfolios.3
2. I should admit that I am proceeding as if observed returns on stocks and bonds were
consistent with reasonable values of relative risk aversion. This, of course, is not the
case. But I am not going to deal with the equity-premium and risk-free-rate puzzles
here.
3. Going to a fully funded system may increase their savings in the long run so much that
such households will be able to tap into higher-risk, higher-return assets. But the authors themselves seem to discount such a possibility, since they indicate that even for
households near retirement the median financial assets are less than one-half of annual
earnings.
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AND CAPITALTAXATION
3.3 PARETOIMPROVEMENT
There is some discussion in the paper of the possibility of a Paretoimproving transition. This arises when the intergenerational redistribution implied by the transition is combined with a reform of the tax system
which reduces distortions. Typically, these proposed reforms involve
combining capital levies with the elimination of the capital income tax.
Such a combination is achieved for example, by moving from a system of
income taxes to a system of consumption taxes. I don't have much to say
about capital levies except that it would be wonderful to have a one-time
capital levy every time. However, I would like to suggest that the case for
eliminating capital income taxation is not so clear-cut.
When individuals are subject to idiosyncratic shocks which are uninsured, a case can be made for capital taxation. In such situations it can easily happen that the aggregate capital stock affects not only the aggregate
level of consumption but also its distribution among consumers. Individual consumers do take into account the effect of their saving on their mean
level of consumption, but do not take into account its effect on the distribution of consumption among all consumers. The social planner cares not
only about the mean level of consumption but also about its distribution
and would be willing to trade off a slightly lower mean for a slightly less
disperse distribution. Thus, the social planner would want to tax capital in
order to have a lower capital stock and less dispersed consumption.
A simple model with this feature is the following: Consider a twoperiod economy with a continuum of ex ante identical consumers of unit
measure who receive an endowment of y units in the first period. They
consume some of this endowment in the first period and save the rest as
capital (K) for the second period. In the second period they have a random
and uninsurable idiosyncratic labor endowment denoted by n. Assume
that E(n) = 1 and, further, that there is a neoclassical production function
F(K,N) and competitive factor markets. Then a typical individual's
second-period consumption, denoted by c, is given by c = RK + wn,
where R = F1(K,1)and w = F2(K,1). Substituting these, we can write c =
F(K,1) + (n - 1)F2(K,1).It follows that E(c) = F(K,1) and ro(c)= at(n)F2(K,),
where Codenotes standard deviation. It can be seen that the aggregate
capital stock affects not only aggregate consumption but also its distribution. Further, since F2(K,1) is increasing in K, it follows that a higher capital
stock will increase the dispersion of consumption. In this example, the
social planner will prefer a smaller capital stock than what would otherwise obtain.4
4. To keep matters simple I have assumed an inelastic labor supply. This raises the possibility of taxing labor income at a 100% rate and returning the proceeds in equal per capita
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Or course, a relevant question is whether this effect is quantitatively
important. In some previous work of mine on the desirability of taxing
capital income with incomplete insurance markets (Aiyagari, 1994), I
found that it was quite possible to get optimal capital income-tax rates in
the 20-30% range for empirically reasonable values of risk aversion and
labor supply elasticities.
Therefore, schemes which rely on reducing or eliminating capital taxation to effect a Pareto-improving transition to a fully funded system may
not look so good once idiosyncratic risk is taken into account.
KSW (1996) show that a Pareto improvement may be possible if the
accrued benefits to current and future retirees are financed by a consumption tax. This is because the consumption tax is in part a capital
levy on current wealth holders, so that it is equivalent to using lumpsum taxes in part to finance the accrued benefits to current and future
retirees instead of a wage tax. The reduction in the distortion of labor
supply can generate a Pareto improvement. However, they assume that
lump-sum redistributions can be used to maintain the welfare of transition generations at their pretransition levels. This in itself limits the longrun welfare gains. If distortionary taxes have to be used to maintain the
welfare of transition generations at their pretransition levels, then this
will further limit the long-run gains from the transition to a fully funded
system. As KSW also show, if a wage tax is used to pay for the accrued
benefits to current and future retirees, then the long-run welfare gains
are even smaller.
3.4 ALTRUISTIC
BEQUESTS
An interesting idea for modeling that is touched on very briefly in the
paper is the following: Even if the transition generations are worse off in
terms of their own utility, if they care about the welfare of their descendants, then they might be better off overall. Most analyses of social
security tend to be carried out in models without altruistic bequest motives. Yet the very fact that we are all talking about how going to a fully
funded system would confer such large long-run benefits on future
generations suggests that this is a modeling feature that needs to be
studied.
In this connection the following argument put forward by Bernheim
(1989) is worth noting. He argued that in a setting in which parents care
about children altruistically, any equilibrium with positive bequests must
amount. This would effectively complete the missing insurance market and eliminate
the need to resort to capital taxation. A simple way around this is to make labor supply
elastic, which would bring back the optimality of taxing capital income.
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be suboptimal. The reasoning is quite simple. In an equilibrium with
positive bequests, reducing the parent's consumption by one unit and
increasing the child's consumption by one unit will result in a Paretosuperior allocation. This is because the parent is no worse off (since he
was initially making a positive bequest, he must be equating his own
marginal utility of consumption with that of his child) and the child must
be better off.
Applying the above argument to the transition generations in a transition to a fully funded system, we can conclude that it is not possible for the
overall utility of a transition generation (including their valuation of their
descendants' utility) to increase. The reason is that, if the transition generation was making positive bequests, then it would simply reduce its bequests and be no worse off. If such a transition generation was not making
a bequest, then it must necessarily be worse off, since its own marginal
utility of consumption must have been higher than its descendants'.
Taking account of altruistic bequest motives must necessarily reduce
the potential for long-term welfare gains arising through increased capital accumulation. This is quite obvious when there are some dynasties
which are always bequest-linked, but is less obvious when there are no
such dynasties. However, so long as some parents are making positive
bequests some of the time, it is possible for the long-run capital stock not
to increase at all. To see a simple example of this, consider again a
version of the Diamond (1965) OG model with a continuum of twoperiod-lived altruistic generations in each period. Assume that the discount factor that these parents apply to their descendant is random and
idiosyncratic. A random fraction Tsof each new generation cares highly
for its children and has a discount factor Ph, whereas the remaining
fraction cares less for its children and has a discount factor P1 < Ph.
Assume that the utility from own consumption is of the form cl + u(c2),
where cl and c2 are the first- and second-period consumptions. I will also
make a special assumption, which is that parents do not know their
children's type (high or low discount factor) when they make a bequest,
i.e., parents do not know whether their own children care a lot or a little
for their grandchildren. This means that parents cannot condition their
bequest on their children's type.
It's now easy to characterize steady states in the above model. Optimal saving behavior implies that u' (c2) = 1/R, where R is the gross return
to capital. Optimal bequest behavior implies that u' (c2) P3with equality
if bequests are positive. One type of steady state is characterized by R =
1/h < 1/p1. In such a steady state, parents who happen to care a lot for
their children will make positive bequests, whereas parents who do not
care as much for their children will not make bequests. Given the idiosyn-
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cratic nature of altruism, there will never be any dynasty that is continuously bequest-linked; once a potential dynasty produces a child who
doesn't care much for his own child, the bequest link will be broken.
Despite this feature, the long-run capital stock is pegged by the altruism
of those parents who care a lot for their children. A transition to a fully
funded social security system from an unfunded one will create a lot of
distributional effects, but will have no effect on the long-run capital
stock, long-run real wage, or long-run per capita consumption.
Admittedly, the above example is somewhat special, but I think it does
suggest that taking account of altruistic bequests will further limit longrun gains through the channel of increased saving and capital accumulation from the transition to a fully funded system. So I think that the very
argument that the transition generations might be better off once they
take into account the higher welfare of their descendants implies that
there won't be much gain for future generations on average.
CONSIDERATIONS
3.5 POLITICAL-ECONOMY
Political-economy considerations are extremely relevant in designing
transition schemes, as these schemes will have to be politically feasible
in order to have a chance of being adopted. These considerations help us
understand why an unfunded system which yields a lower return than
capital and imposes possibly significant long-run welfare losses is so
hard to change-see Galasso (1996), Cooley and Soares (1996). The key
insight here is that from the point of view of many current workers the
social security taxes they have already paid are sunk costs-what matters to them is the taxes yet to be paid and the benefits to be received
upon retirement. From this perspective it can easily be the case that the
median voter is one for whom an unfunded system yields a higher
return than capital. In addition, from the point of view of the median
voter, continuing an unfunded system results in lower savings and a
lower capital stock, and hence a higher return on accumulated wealth,
than does moving to a fully funded system. This latter general equilibrium effect can explain why the median voter might prefer an unfunded
social security system with an internal rate of return that is lower than
that on capital. In this connection it is very revealing to consider who are
the losers in a transition to a fully funded system when there is no
compensation scheme in place. KSW (1996) provide the information in
Table 1 based on their simulation model.
The table, in combination with the result that significant long-run
benefits are unlikely unless the current retirees and the transition generations are made to bear a significant share of the burden of paying off the
accrued benefits, shows the difficulties in making the transition politi-
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Table1
Losers
Taxschemeforfinancingaccruedbenefits (yearsof age)
Consumptiontax
Income tax
Wage tax

34-74
24-74
13-74

cally feasible. A majority of existing voters prefer to keep the current
unfunded system, and most of the people who might benefit from the
transition to a fully funded system are not around to vote.

4. Conclusion
Based on the above considerations I conclude that the case for making a
transition to a fully funded system may not be as compelling as Feldstein
and Samwick suggest. Further quantitative analysis to take account of
the factors I have brought out in my discussion would be very helpful in
evaluating the merits of this suggestion.

Editors'Note
Rao Aiyagari died suddenly on May 20, 1997. He will be greatly missed.
The Editors thank Rao's colleague Per Krusell for helping us obtain the
above discussion. We hope that it will serve as a small reminder of Rao's
keen intelligence and insight.
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Feldstein and Samwick have produced a provocative, challenging, and
useful paper. It's provocative in claiming that we can privatize social
security in a manner that will yield very significant long-run welfare
gains. It's challenging in asking the reader to wade through a host of
welfare, excess-burden, rate-of-return, capital-accumulation, and riskadjustment calculations. And it's useful in clarifying an important way
in which social security might be reformed.
The paper begins with a description of the long-term fiscal fiasco being
produced in Washington through the unrestrained growth of pay-asyou-go entitlement programs. Feldstein and Samwick point out that
raising payroll taxes to cover social security and Medicare benefits on a
pay-as-you-go basis will leave our children paying over a third of their
lifetime earnings in payroll taxes alone. This assessment is based on the
social security actuaries' intermediate projections. It's important to realize that the intermediate projections made by social security actuaries are
routinely overoptimistic. The current intermediate projections appear to
be particularly optimistic with respect to real wage growth, which in
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recent years has been running at less than one-third the rate assumed by
the actuaries, and with respect to future longevity improvements, which
our country's top demographers think are way off base. It's also important to realize that the problem is not just demographics. If the CPI
commission is right, real social security benefits are rising by as much as
1.5% more each year than they should be. And real Medicare benefits
continue to grow many times faster than the economy. Indeed, over the
last four years alone, real Medicare benefits per beneficiary grew by onequarter. Last year, real Medicare benefits per beneficiary grew 12 times
faster than the real wages of the workers paying for those benefits.
June O'Neill, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, recently
summarized the long-term fiscal situation in a way which I think is particularly useful. She pointed out that were we to pay for all of the government's entitlement and other spending commitments over the next 75
years with an immediate and permanent increase in federal income-tax
rates, the requisite rate hike would be 50%. Were we to wait for five years
to raise income-tax rates the necessary tax hike would be 56%. And were
we to wait for 20 years, the requisite tax hike would be 87%.
Clearly, we need to take drastic actions to avoid taxing our economy to
death. Privatizing social security, the authors claim, is one of them. Their
personal retirement system would, over time, fully privatize social security and completely eliminate the distortionary social security payroll
tax.
Although the authors put the best spin on their proposal, in essence it
boils down to making current workers pay off social security's unfunded
liability. Under their plan, workers receive their accrued social security
benefits (i.e., the benefits they've earned based on past contributions),
but are forced to pay social security taxes for many years in the future
without receiving any additional benefits back in exchange for any of
these taxes. That's the bad news because, as the authors tell us, under
the existing system we can, on average, expect to get back about one
dollar in benefits, measured in present value, for every four dollars we
are forced to pay in social security taxes. For workers currently nearer to
retirement the bad news is, however, worse than that calculation suggests. The reason is that under social security's current structure, the
marginal present value of benefits one gets in exchange for marginal
contributions is higher for older workers, because they are closer to
receiving their benefits. Hence these older workers have the most to lose
under the Feldstein-Samwick plan.
The good news is that because current workers will only get their
prereform accrued social security benefits in retirement, the amount of
payroll taxes needed to cover aggregate social security benefits will de-
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dine over time, ultimately to zero. This zero long-run social security
payroll tax can be compared with the 18.75% tax rate that would prevail
under the existing system were we to annually adjust payroll tax rates to
meet annual social security benefit payments. Getting our kids out from
under an 18.75% payroll tax will, obviously, help them a lot. The interesting thing we lear from Feldstein and Samwick is that helping our kids
out a lot can be done at a fairly small cost to us.
In addition to eliminating the accrual of additional social security benefits and altering the time path of social security payroll tax rates, the
personal retirement system forces people to place, on average, about 2%
of their earnings in a private account. The precise size of this mandatory
saving is cohort-specific, with the rate of contribution set to ensure that
one's PRA account plus prereform accrued social security benefits will
deliver the level of retirement income that would be received under the
current system.
Although the authors will disagree, I view this mandatory saving as a
sideshow. Since most American workers are not, in my view, liquidityconstrained, I believe they would respond to this mandatory saving by
cutting back on their own private saving; i.e., I think their retirement
income would end up the same whether or not the personal retirement
system included the mandatory PRA contribution. This undoing of the
mandatory PRA contribution can take many forms, including cutting
back on 401(k), 403(b), IRA, and other tax-deferred contributions.
Once I separate the social security and mandatory PRA elements of
the proposal, I start to wonder about the legitimacy of some of the
authors' calculations. To begin with, I wonder what it means to let the
PRAs accumulate capital income entirely tax-free. If workers do what I
think they'll do and simply put assets they have already accumulated or
would otherwise accumulate into the PRAs, the government will, on
balance, be out the corporate income taxes and the personal capital
income taxes that would otherwise be earned on the income from these
assets. Since Feldstein and Samwick don't include the cost to workers of
paying additional other taxes to make up the loss in federal revenues, I
wonder if they are overstating the welfare gains of their plan.
Of course, based on the authors' maintained assumption-that each
dollar contributed to PRAs represents an additional dollar of net national
saving-there is no loss in federal revenue. But this extreme liquidityconstrained Keynesian view has, in my view, no empirical basis.
Viewing the mandatory PRA contributions, as I do, as simply a
relabeling of private saving also leads me to question Feldstein and
Samwick's effective payroll tax rate during the transition. They seem to
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treat the PRA contribution as a tax, when it's not, and they also seem to
assume that workers will still get something back at the margin for
contributing to social security, which, if I understand things right, they
won't. The mistakes here, if they are mistakes, are, however, likely to be
small and offsetting. Once again, my reference point for thinking about
these issues is the life-cycle model. But even under their assumption that
workers are 100% liquidity-constrained at the margin, a dollar contributed to a PRA should be valued at more than zero.
My view of the PRA contributions also leads me to question Feldstein
and Samwick's calculations of the effect of capital accumulation. I don't
think the PRAs per se will alter capital accumulation, since every dollar
in a PRA is likely to be matched by a dollar less in a non-PRA account. I
think that the main effect on capital accumulation will arise from making
current workers pay off the current system's accrued liability. In lowering their remaining lifetime incomes (by giving them a zero gross rate of
return on their marginal social security contributions), the proposal will
lower their consumption and, thereby, reduce aggregate consumption
and raise national saving.
I also have to admit to being worried about Table 5's deadweight-loss
calculation. Even assuming the reduction in effective tax rates is correctly calculated, I don't understand how the long-run decline in the rate
of social security taxation can be added to reductions in deadweight
losses. We know that, for the intertemporal economy as a whole, the
only welfare gains are those arising from efficiency improvements. Feldstein and Samwick seem to be acknowledging this in leaving out of their
calculation the offsetting effects of changes in factor income arising from
the policy's affect on capital accumulation, but they don't seem to realize
that the same is true of reductions in net taxes. Apart from efficiency
gains, the government's intertemporal budget constraint tells us that,
discounted at the future time path of the economy's marginal product of
capital, the benefits to future generations of lowering their net tax payments is exactly offset by the costs to current generations of paying
higher net taxes. Given the presence of the tax terms in Table 5, and
given that Feldstein and Samwick are not discounting at the marginal
product of capital, but at a much lower rate, I'm led to view Table 5 as a
social-welfare calculation that assumes that the United States is a small
open economy whose factor prices are set from abroad. Considered as a
social-welfare calculation, Table 5 does not represent a purely scientific
description of what happens to particular cohorts. Instead, it represents
the authors' personal weighting of income in the present vs. income in
the future.
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Table 6's cohort-specific net welfare gains should and do include the
welfare effects of changes in their net taxes, but they leave out the
welfare effects of factor price changes. This is likely to be a big omission.
My bottom line here is that, while I agree with the paper's broad
conclusions, I question the precise way the paper reaches many of them.
The reason I agree with their broad conclusions is that, together with
Kent Smetters and Jan Walliser of the CBO, I've simulated the kind of
transition Feldstein and Samwick are considering, albeit in a quite stylized model, and obtained qualitatively similar results. The advantage of
using a model like ours that has an explicit utility function is that there is
no need to approximate excess burdens. In addition, one can display the
precise changes in utility of each cohort and of each member within a
cohort. Hence, policy-induced welfare changes can be presented for each
and every agent without the need to make interpersonal comparisons.

Discussion
The authors began the discussion by responding to the formal comments. Andrew Samwick emphasized that their plan would not change
the benefits paid in retirement, only the time pattern of taxes, as needed
to pay for the transition. He disagreed with the argument that their
proposal would reduce private savings, on the grounds that-given that
50% of the population have less than six months of income going into
retirement and that 60% of the population hold no stock-there is little
scope for an offsetting response. Feldstein also argued against the likelihood of a substantial endogenous response of saving in practice, contending that Kotlikoff's simulation results rely too heavily on the assumption
of full optimization by consumers. He suggested that the evidence on
ownership of financial assets, cited by Samwick, weighs against the conclusion that people are fully forward-looking in their behavior.
Matthew Shapiro questioned the source of the low 2% tax rate necessary to pay for the transition. He suggested that the tax burden would be
twice that without the corporate income tax rebate; thus the paper is
arguably more about corporate income tax policy than about social security. Feldstein disagreed, noting that the proposed corporate tax rebate
would apply only to the returns to incremental capital, not to all corporate revenues.
Continuing on the theme of what the paper is "really" about, Greg
Mankiw thought the paper's core idea was exploiting the power of compound interest. Essentially the proposal is to confiscate resources from
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the current generation, invest them, then use the compounded returns
to mitigate the tax burden of future generations. An interesting question
is why people do not take of advantage of the supposedly high real
return to capital on their own, without government coercion. One possible answer is disincentives created by the tax system. A second possibility is "myopic" behavior by the public, as suggested by the work of Chris
Carroll on buffer stock saving. Mankiw questioned the political feasibility
of a plan that mandates savings given the public's apparent preference
for holding low levels of financial assets. Responding, Carroll cautioned
that it was important to remember what drove the results of his work. In
particular, it is not myopia or irrationality per se: Indeed, his models
assume a moderate rate of time preference (e.g., 4% per year) and rapid
growth in income over the life cycle (implying that most saving should be
done later in life). More important to his results is his assumption, motivated by the fact that most people do not own stocks, that consumers
face a real riskless interest rate that is close to zero. Carroll conjectured
that, in his models, agents would respond to a 9% real rate of return by
saving considerably more, and perhaps by investing in risky assets.
Robert Hall put forth the view that the calculations of the paper were
driven primarily by the so-called equity-premium puzzle, although in
this paper the assumed premium is on physical capital rather than on
stocks per se. He argued that the difference between the historical return
on capital and the risk-free rate cannot be justified by reasonable levels
of risk aversion, and therefore presents an arbitrage opportunity for the
government that applies more generally than to social security. The logical implication of this paper, he suggested, is that the government
should either borrow or raise taxes, invest the proceeds in capital (or
stocks), and use the high returns to finance other types of government
expenditure as well.
Angus Deaton brought up the issue of distributional effects. Looking
at any given cohort over time, one finds income inequality increasing as
the cohort gets older. This phenomenon implies that, if a fixed percentage of wages is earmarked for PRAs, the dispersion in PRA balances
would be increasing with age (and at a faster rate than the dispersion in
earnings). Further, if returns are positively correlated with the amounts
in the PRAs, a Rao Aiyagari suggested, then this plan could easily generate substantial wealth inequality. Feldstein agreed that this is an issue
and mentioned some early experimentation they performed to consider
it. Using empirical earnings profiles, they found that a redistributive
scheme designed to prevent anyone from falling below half the median
income in retirement could be financed by a tax rate of 2.5%. It would
also be possible to give differential rebates on the corporate tax in order
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to generate higher real returns for people in the lower brackets. In sum,
Feldstein suggested that there would be ample flexibility in their plan to
eliminate poverty among the retired, although perhaps not inequality
per se. Kotlikoff did not agree with the concern over inequality, since
liquidity-constrained people would be forced to save more and thus
would end up wealthier than they would have otherwise. Deaton responded that a person who was unemployed at different times of his or
her life, and who kept most savings in the form of cash, would likely end
up with a very inadequate sum in the PRA. Feldstein remarked that the
corporate tax rate would help even very risk-averse individuals who
refuse to hold stocks, as those people would get an extra 3% return even
on bonds.
Bennett McCallum wondered why the focus of the paper was initially
on the problem of an aging population when the benefits of PRAs are
independent of any demographic issue. If the problem is basically
demographic, why not focus on proposals such as advancing the retirement age? Feldstein agreed that raising the retirement age is an option
but that it would not be enough, particularly for Medicare. He pointed
out that their paper showed that approaches such as increasing the
retirement age may not even be necessary. Mark Bils followed up on
the issue of the retirement age by noting that it distorts investment in
human capital and removes one way to adjust to risk, i.e., working
longer rather than reducing consumption. Feldstein remarked that, in
this regard, current social security reforms were steps in the right direction. These reforms are not only increasing the age of retirement but
include actuarial adjustments, so that if one chooses to work longer the
benefits eventually collected will increase appropriately.

